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ABSTRACT
This case study of pension reform politics examines the
impact of a state pension commission, public employee
unions, the legislature, the press and civic groups in
New York in the 1970's. Contributions to the eight public
retirement systems cost 11.5 billion in 1970, and doubled
by 1974. The state established a commission to recommend
reforms that would reduce pension costs or ruture employ-
ees. The pension commission's first reform proposal in
1973 was defeated by the determined opposition of a power-
ful coalition of public employee unions. Most legislators
avoided this very controversial issue. In 1975 the newly
elected governor tried to abolish the pension commission,
which was a political embarrassment. He was forced to
back down, after furious editorial attacks, and the re-
lease of a very damaging report by the pension commission
which found severe underfunding of the New York City re-
tirement systems. The pension commission again submitted
a proposal in 1976. Its major features were the integra-
tion of pensions with Social Security benefits, higher age
age service requirements for normal retirement, 35 salary
contributions, a 3% cost-of-living escalator, and a uni-
form plan for all public employees. This proposal also re-
ceived little initial legislative support. At the end of
the session, due to the interplay-of public clamor, inclu-
ding well-timed newspaper editorials, and interest group
lobbying; visions of New York City's default; partisan
politics; and the fragmentation of union opposition; the
legislature finally passed a comprehensive reform bill.
New York became one of a very few places where attempt
to reform pensions and cut benefits in any way were
successful.
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Introduction
In mid-January, 1973, the Permanent Commission on Public
Employee Pension and Retirement Systems released its first
report recommending a reduction in pension benefits provided
under all public employee pension plans in the state of New
York. The report called for the consolidation of all retire-
ment plans encompassed by the state's eight retirement systems
into one uniform plan. It also proposed to reduce the pension
of a public employee paid out by state or local government
by the amount the employee would receive from Social Security.
At the outset, the proposal received almost no support
from state and local officials and others concerned
with pensions. Leaders in the state legislature showed more
wariness than interest. Public employee unions were parti-
cularly vehement in their opposition. They immediately joined
together to fight the proposed changes. Even the Governor
who had established the Commission in the first place two
years earlier, with a view toward cutting the state's pension
costs, did not give his support to the proposal. The so-
called Kinzel plan, named for the Commission's chairman,
never made it through .the legislature in complete form.
The original proposal called for comprehensive, permanent
change. What passed the legislature was temporary and less
broad.
Nevertheless a process had begun. Three years later,
in the closing hours of its 1976 session, the state legis-
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lature passed the Coordinated Escalator Retirement Act,
CO-ESC, which included virtually all the policy changes
that the Pension Commission had called for in its original
CO-ESC proposal in January of that year. CO-ESC became law
despite the furious opposition of public employee unions,
despite the fact that powerful legislators friendly to the
unions had no desire to let the bill pass as the 1976 session
began, and despite the fact that there was a Democratic governor,
New York's first in sixteen years, who one year earlier had
tried to put the pension commission out of existence.
New York was not at all unique in its concern over,
and scrutiny of, public employee pensions. An article in
U.S. News and World Report, in July 1971, exemplified the
worries about "skyrocketing pension costs" in many states
and cities. Total outlays for public pensions, including
federal ones, were expected to triple between 1971 and 1980.
Many governments were paying 10o to 20% of their payroll
for pension plans. Although New York City figured prominently
in the article,"with the most liberal public or private pen-
sions in the country," the article reported of government
generosity in Chicago, Washington D.C., Philadelphia, and
other places. One of the examples of expensive pensions
was the celebrated case of Hamtramck, Michigan, where the
city could paybeither employees, retirees nor creditors in
1970. That year, the city's pension costs were exactly half
its $2 million deficit.
The article also reported the growing alarm over unfunded
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liabilities* -- $65 billion in the U.S. Civil Service; and
hundreds of millions of dollars in many city and state systems.
An article in Institutional Investor in June 1975 said that
"The complacent view is rapidly evaporating" that pension
funding problems would not hurt cities. In one of the art-
icle's examples, the unfunded liability of the Los Angeles
police and firemen's pension plan was $1 billion, which the
city was amortizing over 70 years -- twice the maximum allow-
able time under federal legislation for private pension
funds. Other cities were not amortizing liabilities at all,
because they could not find present cash to put aside for
future costs.
Both articles found fault with local administrations
and legislatures for granting benefit increases to employees
practically on demand, and for failing to adequately fund
accrued liabilities.
National concern was further highlighted when the fed-
eral Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which
enacted substantial new safeguards and regulations for cor-
porate pension plans, also mandated a two-year Congressional
study of public plans. It was expected at the time that
the study would lead to new demands for federal regulation
of state and local pension systems.
This thesis is about the events during the six-year
Long term obligations tobeneficiaries, which are not matched
by accrued assets (as opposed to funded liabilities).
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period that began with the establishment of the permanent
commission, and ended with the enactment of CO-EISC. During
this period, the Pension Commission issued its two major
reform proposals, reported on the funding status and actu-
arial valuation of the five New York City retirement systems,
and wrote memoranda to the Governor and legislature on bills
that would affect public employee pensions. Actions of the
Pension Commission are the pivot of the story because their
effect was to catalyze public affairs and make public em-
ployee pensions a primary political issue in the 1970's.
There are a number of other important themes, brought
out by events of this period. The ability of unions to
bargain collectively, about any issue which affects the
well-being of their members, is one such theme. The way
state legislature makes decisions and sets policy is another.
The influence of business interests and of the press in the
making of public policy is an important topic. The use of
numerical data and assumptions underlying that data, the
subject of enormous conflict, is another theme. The impact
of an enormous crisis, the default of New York City, on
public pension policy is yet another. These themes are
part of the history briefly outlined in the first two para-
graphs, and yet do not capture all the factors which led
to a p'articular route for pension reform. They are the
departure point, for several sets of research questions which
this thesis attempts to address.
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The first set of questions is about the pension commis-
sion itself. Whose interests was it intended to serve?
What means did it use to bring about change? How did the
commission contribute to actions taken by the press and by
business groups?
The role of organized labor is a second theme. What
were the real stakes for the public employee unions? How
did the very diverse unions in the state which were affected
by pension reform interact with one another? Why did they
fail not only to win new pension benefits, but to prevent
fttrther conservative reform as well?
Turning to the state legislature, how did this body
manage to pass controversial pension legislation? How did
legislative caution and disapproval eventually change to
support? How did political partisanship affect the legis-
lative outcome?
How did New York City's financial crisis affect pension
reform, and the influence of the pension commission itself?
What information was used to support opposing viewpoints,
and what conflicts arose of the use of data?
Finally, what, if any, implications are there in all
this for the way pension policy is made? Whose interests
are involved in setting pension policy? What did, or will,
the Pehsion Commission's reforms actually achieve?
The chapters cover the following main topics: (1)
establishment of a permanent state commission on public
employee pensior and the release of that commission's first
-6-
reform proposal; (2) the response of public employee unions
and the legislature to the Kinzel plan; (3) the enactment
of the Pension Reform Act of 1973; (4) Governor Carey's attempt
to abolish the Pension Commission, the breaking of New York
City's fiscal crisis, and the growing interest in pensions
by business and public interest groups in the state; and
(5) the enactment of CO-ESC.
-7-
Footnotes -- Introduction
1. U.. News & World Report, July 19, 1971.
2. Barbara A. Patocka, Institutional Investor, June 1975.
3. Ibid.
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Chapter I.
The first public employee pension in New York, and in
the nation, was initiated in 1857. It was a lump-sum pay-
ment for New York City policemen disabled in the line-of-
duty. New York City firemen received the same benefit in
1866. In 1878 New York City granted the first pensions based
only on service* to police and firemen. The police pension
was half-pay after 25 years of service. Firemen were eli-
gible for half-pay after 20 years of service. Other pension
plans began in the 1890's for New York City health depart-
ment employees, for teachers, and in 1911, for all city
employees not otherwise covered. By 1916 there were so
many plans, each with its own requirements and idiosyncrasies,
that a mayor's Commission on Pensions called to examine them
found "a tangled mess of conflicting provisions."'
At the state level events paralleled the development
of pensions in New York City. ~ The state set up a Commission
on Pensions in 1918 to examine its pension affairs. As a
result of the studies, both state and city began to reform
their pensions systems and create actuarially based, con-
solidated ones, beginning in 1920.2
In 1971, there were eight retirement systems in New
York. The state government administered three of them.
These were the Employees' Retirement System, (founded in 1920)
Years of employment, as distinguished from disability.
- 9 -
which provided for general* employees of the state and local
governments outside of New York City; the Teachers' Retire-
ment System, also founded in 1920, which included teachers
and school administrators; and the Policemens! and Firemens'
Retirement System, founded in 1966. The last-named separated
those employees from the Employees' Retirement System.3
New York City's five systems were the Employees' Retire-
ment System (1920), the Teachers' Retirement System (1917),
the Board of Education Retirement System (providing for non-
teaching employees of the Board of Education), the Police
Pension Fund (1940), and the Fire Department Pension Fund
(1940). In 1971 there were about 315,000 active members**
and about 72,000 beneficiaries.*** In 1973-74 the state
systems counted approximately 800,000 active members, and
about 135,000 benefiiries.
Two of the state systems were directly under the state
Comptroller, the Employees' Re.tirement System and the Police-
mens' and Firemens' Retirement System. The Teachers' System
had a nine-member board with representatives chosen by teachers,
school boards, school administrators, the Comptroller's office,
and one banker. The New York City funds had boards composed
of city officials and union leaders or representatives.
Usually means anyone other than teacher, policeman, or fireman.
Current employees enrolled in one of the systems.
Retirees and their dependents receiving benefits.
1?
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The Mayor was a member of three boards, the Comptroller of
all five. 5
Several aspects of these pension systems are notable,
for the perspective they give on future events. One is the
separatism among different kinds of employees, which goes
back to the earliest pension plans. In New York, and in
most states, teachers, policemen, and firemen had plans dis-
tinct from other employees. The first pensions were for
police and firemen, by virtue of the dangerous, arduous nature
of the occupations on one hand, and on the other, manage-
ment's need for a young, able workforce. Teachers, the
largest single occupational group of public employees, also
had separate systems.
In time, within each retirement system there were further
divisions among employees. In the NYC Employees Retirement
System, sanitation workers, transit employees, transit and
housing authority police, and corrections officers had sep-
arate, more advantageous plans than the other members. Many
plans were for a specific subgroup, such as "Nassau County
Park Police." In 1976 the New York State ERS had 16 plans,
the state police and firemen 14, while the state teachers
had only one "Career Pension Plan." The separation between
New York City and all other state and local workers remained,
but after the reforms of the 1920's brought local government
employees in the state systems, state law forbid local gov-
ernments to set up their own, duplicative systems. 6
In 1971 there were two sources of retirement income
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for most public employees. One was the state or city pension,
financed by government and employee contributions to a fund
set aside for this purpose. The other was Federal Social
Security. New York systems had joined Social Security in
the late 1950's. At the time, both pension and Social Sec-
urity benefits were low, so the decision was made not to
coordinate the two in any way. 7
In addition, some employees were entitled to payments
from special annuity funds, administered by their unions
but financed by employer contributions. Payments depended
on the number of days worked, or were a flat annual amount.
The size of the pension for a given employee depended
on the number of years that employee had worked, his age at
retirement, and his final or final-average pay*. The pen-
sion was calculated as a percentage of final salary times
the number of years of service. For example, 2% of final
salary for each of 25 years yields a pension of 50% of final
pay. In this way, rates are designed to accomplish a spec-
ific level of wage replacement, for a certain number of
years of service. There also are modifications of this
formula, in many cases, for employees at different ages;
particularly, for employees retiring at an early age. The
exact numbers in the formula depend in all cases on the em-
ployee'.s occupational group or sub-group. The ultimate
Average pay in x consecutive years of highest earnings;
Usually, final three years of employment.
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cost of pensions to the government employer depends on how
long the employee receives a pension, in addition to how
large the pension is. This is determined by such factors
as whether the employee leaves his job or dies before retire-
ment, how long the employee lives after retirement, whether
benefits continue after his death to other dependents, whether
he is receiving a disability pension (much larger than a
service pension). Investment income from the funds also
affects the cost of pensions to government.
To complete this background information, we need a
picture of the public employee unions which contributed to
the development of pension plans, and which dominated events
over the six-year period covered in this thesis. In 1971
there were 1,043,000 public employees in state and local
government in New York. There were 37 unions of public em-
ployees in the state in 1972: 33 national or international
unions with New York branches,. and 4 which operated only
in New York. Of the 37, 19 were AFL-CIO affiliates, 17
were independent, and 1 had dual affiliation. Most unions
were divided into geographic and functional groups. Ten
unions accounted for over 90f of all government employee
union locals. Six of these were for state and local employees,
with 624,000 employees in 1516 locals. 8
In unions, as with retirement systems, New York City
and "upstate" unions (includes- suburban NYC, rural areas
of the state, and smaller cities) were distinct from one
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another. Although NYC union locals and councils belonged
to larger state organizations, the NYC group often stood
out as a dominant union in state politics, due to its size
and/or strong tradition of political activism. About ten
union organizations, including centralized groups, districts,
and locals, were prominent in the struggle over pensions,
due to the outspoken positions,and actionsof their leaders.
The Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA), an
independent New York group representing over 200,000 state
and local government general employees in 1971, was one of
these. It was the largest union in the state, organized
into six regional conferences. Its locals covered employees
everywhere in the state except New York City. 9
New York State United Teachers included upstate and
suburban teachers (National Education Association affiliates),
and the powerful New York City United Federation of Teachers
(American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO). Membership was
200,000, the second largest in the state.10
The New York State Police Conference (independent,
45,000 members) included nine regional conferences of local
Patrolmen's Benevolent Associations (PBA's), and four New
York City PBA's. The four included the NYC PBA (city police,
30,000 members), and the Housing Authority, Transit Authority
and Port Authority PBA's.
District Council 37 (AFSCME* -- AFL-CIO), one of three
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.
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AFSCME councils in the state at the time, numbered 121,000
New York City workers including clerical workers, laborers,
hospital workers, and many others. Transport Workers Local
100 (AFL-CIO) represented NYC transit authority operating
employees. The New York State Fire Fighters Association
(AFL-CIO, 28,000 members) included the NYC Uniformed Fire
Fighters Assocaition, with 11,300 members; the NYC Uniformed
Fire Officers Association; and all other firemen in the state,
in 56 other locals. The NYC Uniformed Sanitationmen's Assoc-
iation (11,000 members) was a Teamsters affiliate. Another
Teamsters group was Local 237 with Public Service Employee
workers in the NYC metropolitan area. 12
This listing excludes the majority of public employee
unions and includes only a very few of the 2-3000 locals
in New York. It includes the groups that took the lead in
the fight against pension reform in the 1970's.
The reform effort of the.1970's was a reaction to the
cost of public employee pensions. Prior to this period,
the state legislature had passed numerous laws liberalizing
pension benefits, throughout the 1960's. At the beginning
of that decade, public employee wages and pension were con-
sidered to be neither high nor adequate, particularly com-
pared to those in private industry. By the end of the decade
the situation had changed considerably. Service requirements
were reduced from 30 and 35 years to 20 and 25 years. Age
requirements fell from age 65 to 55 and 50, or were eliminated.
W-"
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The base pay for computing benefits changed from an average
of the last three or five years of work, to last -year's work or even
last day's pay rate, for some employees.' 3
Actual wages had also increased to match or exceed those
in private industry. State and city employment, and member-
ship in public retirement systems, also increased.
Pension costs increased correspondingly. In 1961, New
York City's five retirement systems cost about $237 million.
In 1971, the city made $691 million in payments, an increase
of 161%. Membership in the city's systems had increased
by about half, while salary expenses had approximately doubled,
over ten years. In 1968, state and local governments paid
$448 million into the three state-administered retirement
systems; in 1974 the three systems cost $1.046 billion.14
By the end of the decade of the 1960's, pensions were
also clearly a central item in collective bargaining. The
Taylor law which passed the state legislature in 1967 guar-
anteed for the first time that all public employees had the
right to organize and bargain collectively. This strengthened
unions' ability to bargain about all items, pensions among
them. Pension benefit increases had also been neglected with
to a certain extent replaced wage increases. In 1960, New
York City instituted the Increased-Take-Home-Pay policy,
under which the city paid all or part of the employee's
salary contribution toward the pension. This had the effect
of a tax-free wage increase. In other cases unions sacrificed
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certain wage goals in order to be able to improve pensions
under new contracts.15
Pensions were also important enough to be the subject
of various labor actions. They were one of the items in the
contract dispute which led to the 1966 transit strike in
New York City. In the settlement, transit workers won the
first half-pay, 20-years-of-service pension for public employ-
ees other than policemen or firemen. In 1971, the state
legislature failed to move toward approving a pension contract
agreed to by New York City and District Council 37 of AFSCME.
Bridgetenders in the city went on strike in'protest, leaving
drawbridges open and causing immense traffic jams. They
only returned to work when the city agreed to submit the
legislation the following year. Later that year, firemen
in New York City rejected a contract because they were not
satisfied with a pension provision.16
In the mid- to late 1960's, the Rockefeller administra-
tion began to turn its attention to the size and type of
public pensions in the state. In December 1965, Governor
Rockefeller appointed a committee to conduct a comprehensive
study of the State Employee's Retirement System. The com-
mittee's mandate noted that the pension legislation of the
last five years or so had resulted in a complex, ill-struc-
tured and idiosyncratic retirement system. The committee
was charged with developing a retirement system for the state
that would be "simple, uniform, and equitable."
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The report was to consider all the aspects of pension bene-
fits, including age and service requirements, vesting,* death
and disability benefits, and other items; the committee was
also to deal with a number of perceived problems, including
system inequities among members, inadequate benefits, mult-
iplicity of plans, and duplication of benefits by different
sources of retirement income. 7
Rockefeller appointed a committee of five, headed by
David Moore, Dean of the state school of labor relations
at Cornell. The committee's other members were all to be
important in the future controversies over the Kinzel plan.
Milton Alpert was judge of the state Court of Claims in
Albany, and a former Deputy Commissioner in the state Office
of Local Government. Carl Stevenson was a vice-president
of Eastman Kodak and director of employee benefit programs
there. From the Administration, Malcom Wilson, Lieutenant
governor, and Arthur Levitt, Comptroller, were members.
The Moore Committee was actually almost ready to issue
its report in the winter of 1977, but then "had a curious
but significant fate." The Taylor Law had just gone into
effect, in April. The committee felt itself to be in an
anomalous position. It was a committee set up to advise
the governor, but it also would be commenting on something
"Acquisition of a right, upon termination of employment,
to a deferred benefit." Thus, an employee who leaves his
job before he is eligible for retirement is entitled to
receive a pension, when he achieves a normal retirement age.
This is provided that he wored a minimum number of years
to qualify. (pp. 36-37).
- 18 -
which would now be dealt with by collective bargaining. To
avoid the appearance of in any way pre-empting collective
bargaining, the committee decided to not refer to specific
issues which were subject to negotiation at the time. In
Tilove's interpretation, the committee's work had simply
become irrelevant, because it had been based on one centrally-
run, non-negotiable system. 1 8
The final report was released in June, 1969. One sec-
tion of it was on "guiding principles" for a retirement
system. These principles stated the committee's views on
coverage, that is, what risks should be covered by a retire-
ment system, and on standards of evaluation of the effect-
iveness of a pension plan. It also discussed the impact of
federal Social Security benefits, and of a constitutional
provision which made membership in a public retirement systems
an enforceable, contractual right. The report also presented
a "model" retirement system which would fulfill all the cri-
teria discussed. Another section of the report compared
benefits under the NYS ERS with benefits provided by other
states and by private corporations.
The Moore Committee defined the proper scope of coverage
to be protection from the risks of old age, long-term dis-
ability, and premature death. Coverage should not be used
as a panacea for low salaries, poor working conditions, or
any other problems not directly related to the protection of
of employees and their families during retirement.
For the evaluation of the effectiveness of retirement
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system, the Committee concluded that several standards held.
A retirement system"should be easily understood," there should
be equity among employees, and "leapfrogging" should be there-
by prevented. (Where there are plans within the retirement
system that provide differentbenefits to various groups of
employees, leapfrogging is defined as the setting of one
group's maximum benefits as the minimum goal for the next
group which bargains for benefits). A fourth standard was
that the system should have the lowest possible cost. Also,
benefits should be adequate.
The report was fairly specific about how an adequate
benefit should be calculated. Adequacy should be based on
the conceptions that normal retirement is between ages 60
and 70, that 30 years constitutes a'full work career, and
that 1.667% of salary credited for each year of service
would be the general formula for computing benefits. 1.667%
of salary per year of service, times 30 years, would produce
50% of salary. This was stricter than the 2% fraction, which
results in 50% after only 25 years of service. The report
did not provide any guidelines on how much an adequate benefit
would actually be, only that an employee's total income pack-
age should be considered when judging adequacy, and that
lower income employees should in some way be treated more
favorably than high income employees.
The situation was complicated by a constitutional pro-
vision of 1938, which effectively guaranteed that a perman-
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ently granted benefit could not be changed, except to improve
it, for any member of a retirement system. The result of
this provision was that many new pension laws were enacted
temporarily, renewable yearly. This created a confusion of
non-guaranteed pension benefits. The committee recommended
that any new program should be permanently guaranteed. This
would eliminate confusion and uncertainty about future bene-
fits. The Committee presumed that closer scrutiny of pen-
sion plan design and therefore more rationality, would result.
The Committee report stated that established policy
had been to keep Social Security and SERS pensions separate.
The issue here was whether the state should pay for two sep-
arate sources of retirement income without correcting for
"duplications" -- i.e., whether an employee would eventually
receive too much retirement income according to some arbi-
trary standard. Current policy should continue, according
to the committee, because the two programs complement one
another. Social Security payments are supplemented by Con-
gress and provide protection from inflation. On the other
hand, the SERS is more adequately funded than Federal Social
Security, therefore, it is also easier to administer the two
separately. However, the report went on to say that dupli-
cation of benefits should be avoided. This it said should
be done by controlling the SERS benefit, through limitation
on number of years of creditable service, and certain other
mechanisms.
The Moore report recommended three basic changes. First,
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the state should establish a new retirement program for
future state employees, in order to clear away the "clutter
and patchwork" of the present. As part of this
recommendation, any new benefits should be guaranteed, not
temporarily renewable. The benefits provided by SERS should
be held distinct from Social Security, but benefits from
all sources should be used to evaluate adequacy, and dupli-
cation should be avoided. The system's objectives should
be to provide coverage for the risks of old age, long term
disability, and premature death. Benefits should be based
on need, not on the causes of death or disability, or length
of service. Finally, the system should provide protection
from inflation.
The Moore report recommended that a permanent Advisory
Commission on pensions be established, with nine members
appointed by the governor, chaired by the state comptroller.
This would succeed the Advisory Council on Pensions in Civil
Service law.
Three other recommendations were for constitutional
changes. One would be a mandate for actuarily sound, fully
funded systems. Another would be to require immediate funding
of all new benefits. The third would require any changes
to be legislated as general law.
The Moore committee therefore dealt with a number of prob-
lems with state pension policy, but was not able to be def in-
itive. The effect of the Constitutional provision, for
example, was still problematic. What this provision really
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meant was that there could never be less than two retirement
plans for any given group of employees. A new plan would
be added to all the other plans in existence. Each of the
eight retirement systems would administer its old plans,
plus the new one. While trying to clear away the old "clutter
and patchwork," a new layer of benefits would be superimposed.
Another inconsistency was the intention to continue the
separation of Social Security and SERS benefits, while some-
how avoiding duplication at the same time. Although the
Moore report did say that this could be done indirectly,
by putting certain limits on SERS benefits, ultimately the
only way to follow the second part of that recommendation
would be to explicitly take account of the amounts received
from Social Security. To design SERS benefits otherwise
would in effect be guesswork, purporting to follow sound
principles but not based on actual data.
It was also notable that there were two separate con-
curring statements by the five members, upon delivery of the
report to the Governor. Moore, Alpert and Stevenson con-
curred with all the report's recommendations and findngs.
Levitt and Wilson, the only elected officials on the committee,
concurred only with the general findings. The two officials
did not think it appropriate that they recommend a commitment
to particular numbers defining a benefit structure. They
also stated their support for "... the most liberal retire-
ment system consistent with the fiscal capacity ... of the
state."
-23 
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Although the Moore report was not acted upon at the
time of its release, it provided a number of guidelines
such as the aims of a retirement system, and the specification
of benefits. Future reform efforts were to build on these
precedents.
The turning point in pension reform came in 1970-71.
By 1970, members of the largest municipal union, District
Council 37, were the only city employees who had not won
certain benefits that were standard for other city workers.
The basic plan for D.C. 37 members was retirement at age 55,
with 25 years of service. The service fraction was 2.2%
for each year of service, or 55% of final year's pay, and
was scaled down for less than 25 years.1 9
City police and firemen could retire after twenty years,
at half-pay. Sanitation men, and then transit employees,
won twenty-year pensions. Within the NYC Employees Retirement
System, which D.C. 37 members were in, sanitation, corrections
and transit workers and housing police each negotiated sep-
arately for pensions with the city.2 0
In 1970, D.C. 37 negotiated a contract with the Lindsay
administration for a twenty-year half-pay pension payable
at age 55. The contract guaranteed 75% of pay after 30
years service, and 100% after 40 years. Estimated initial
cost of the plan was $30 million. 2 1
The city administration sent the contract to the leg-
islature in Albany for ratification. Senator Marchi, a
highly-respected Republican from NYC and chairman of the
Senate Committee on the City of New York introduced the bill.
It was expected that the contract would have "clear sailing"
in the legislature, as had every other negotiated agreement
since before the advent of the Taylor Law. 22
The contract sent shock waves through Albany. It pro-
posed to erase the unwritten barrier between uniformed em-
ployees (who presumably had more physically-taxing and/or
dangerous jobs) and the lower-paid, lower-status general
city employees. Although there was traditionally a lot of
favorable sentiment in the legislature for the police, for
firemen and for teachers (whose union was possibly the most
powerful in the state), there was no such favoritism toward
general city workers. 23
The issue of contract ratification also underscored anta-
gonisms between Governor Rockefeller and Mayor Lindsay, and
between the Rockefeller administration and Victor Gotbaum,
the head of D.C. 37, a Lindsay supporter and a Democrat.
Several administration officials saw the contract as a fis-
cal and political threat. Lieutenant Governor Malcolm Wilson
urged Rockefeller to set up a permanent state commission
to study and regulate public pension, as the Moore report
had advised.2
Attention and alarm now focussed on New York City, and
especially on the city's powerful public employee unions.
Hostility increased between legislative leaders, Senate
Majority Leader Earl Brydges in particular, and D.C. 37,
w~rv r~~'!
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as the legislature showed no signs of ratifying the con-
tract. Bridgetenders for drawbridges in New York City struck
in protest for two days in June. Traffic in the city was
jammed as commuters tried to get to work over fewer roads.
The message from the striking workers was that suburbanites
(i.e. Republicans) would suffer from their representatives'
26failure to act in Albany.
Senator Brydges, a Republican from Binghamton, did
not take kindly to this show of force. He killed the "Gotbaum
bill," as the contract was known, and all other pending pen-
sion legislation, in retaliation. He then went to work for
a bill to create a permanent pension commission, which passed
in the last few hours of the legislative session that year.
The commission was appropriated $250,000, with a mandate
to submit an initial report to the legislature by January
15, 1972. The legislature passed other "hard line" pension
legislation as well. One measure required all pension bills
to have fiscal notes attached, outlining the cost to govern-
ment of the proposal. Another required budgeting of increased
pension expenses in the year incurred. 27
New York thus followed the lead of several other states,
including Massachusetts, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Ohio, and Washington, in establishing a permanent public-
employee pension commission. Some of these state commissions
had existed for over a decade. The Illinois Public Employee
Pension Laws Commission, made permanent in 1959 (and dating
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back to 1945) included legislators and ordinary citizens
among its members, and was active and influential in that
state. The Massachesetts Retirement Law Commission, esta-
blished in 1958, studied the Massachusetts system on an on-
going basis, and sponsored its own legislation. Other, ad-
hoc commissions existed to study particular issues.27
But, where other state commissions had achieved the
status of non-partisan advisory bodies whose opinions were
widely respected, the New York pension commission began in
an atmosphere of antagonism. It was created for the sole
purpose of cutting pension costs, and was suspected of being
a punishment to unions, for asking for "too much." 2 8
The legislation setting up the commission also speci-
fied that the Governor had the power to appoint five com-
missioners, including one chairman, upon advice and consent
of the Senate. This contrasted with the Moore report, which
had recommended a nine-member panel with the Comptroller as
chairman. Wilson had advised this modification, in order
to ensure "objectivity." A nine-member commission would
presumably have room for labor representatives. This had
probably been the Moore committee's intention. At this time,
however, Wilson preferred to have a smaller group which the
Governor had the sole power to appoint. Actually, Rockefeller
had no real interest in the commission or in working directly
on pensions. Although the power to appoint was the Gover-
nor's, the commission was Wilson's project and he made the
actual appointments. 2 9
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Wilson appointed Otto Kinzel, corporation counsel at
Union Carbide, to chair the commission. Kinzel had been
on public commissions before, though less controversial
ones. He had been a member of the World's Fair Commission
in 1963, where he had met and become friendly with Wilson,
and he had chaired the New York State delegation to the White
House Conference on Youth in 1970.30
Two other appointees were knowledgeable about pensions.
Carl Stevenson had been a member of the Moore committee.
Harold Conroy was former administrative director of the
statewide pension systems. He was also the Commission's only
Democrat.
James F. Murray was retiring as president of Associated
Industries, a statewide lobbying group, and a manufacturer.
John J. Burns was retiring as head of the state Office of
Local Government. Wilson gave them both jobs on the Commis-
sion. The Commission then appointed an executive director,
Dr. Joseph Metz. Metz was a political science professor
from Long Island, a political conservative who had been
active in local politics. Interested in working for the
state, Metz had been directed to the Commission by Wilson. 3 1
The Commission, with its director, first met in late
November, 1971. The newly constituted commission had not
quite two months in which to prepare its report to the Leg-
islature and Governor. Probably for this reason, the report
of January 15, 1972, to a great extent echoed the Moore Com-
mittee without being as definitive about some items. As
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in the Moore report, the Kinzel report discussed guidelines
for a retirement program, the importance of constitutional
provisions, Social Security and the Taylor Law. But, for
example, where the Moore committee related adequacy of bene-
fits to a 30-year career, a normal retirement age of 60-70,
and a service credit of 1.667f of salary, Kinzel only said
the adequacy should be based on concepts of normal career
length, appropriate retirement age, and a general formula
for calculating benefits. The Commission left itself free
to later determine the specific number and ranges it would
assign to those concepts. 3 2
Kinzel also reiterated an end to "special plans," as
Moore had, but Kinzel then favored special plans for em-
ployees in "hazardous" jobs, which would cover at the very
least policement and firemen.. In another example, where
Moore called for a standard of "lowest possible cost,"
Kinzel now termed this "taxpayer capacity."
The Kinzel Commission's only active recommendation
at this time was for the postponement of legislative action
on pending pension bills until the Commission had a chance
to examine both the renewal of existing "temporary" benefits,
and all new amendments for substantive change. Among the
latter, the D.C. 37 contract was the outstanding item at this
time.
During the 1972 legislative session, New York City
unions and the city administration renewed the attempt to
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enact the D.C. 37 contract. The city added a fiscal note
to the bill, showing a projected initial cost of $35 million,
and made it retroactive to July, 1970. The bill was intro-
duced the first week in March. 33
Also in March, union leaders formed a statewide coali-
tion to push for ratification. It was headed by Ray Corbett,
state AFL-CIO director, and included both public and private
employee unions. According to Corbett, the Pension Commis-
sion was a fraud, designed to prevent passage of the D.C.
37 pension bill. 34
Legislative response was not encouraging. Brydges,
the powerful Senate leader, maintained that a pension mora-
toriom was indeed in force,and included the Gotbaum bill.
Senator Marchi kept the bill in committee. 35
The moratorium position received a blow when in April
the legislature passed, and Rockefeller approved, an examp-
tion to the new law requiring current hdgeting of pension
benefits, for the City of Rochester. Rochester had nego-
tiated new benefits for policemen and firemen before the law
was passed, and did not intend to make an appropriation for
the benefits applicable in fiscal year 1972. After this
event, union leaders and city officials tried again to get
the D,C, 37 bill moved, but were unsuccessful. 36
The Legislature, under Republican leadership, demon-
strated that its hard line on pensions, begun in 1971, still
remained. With this encouragement, the Pension Commission
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began work on a reform proposal for the state's retirement
systems. In 1973, the Commission hired an actuarial consul-
tant from the Martin Segal Company, Robert Tilove. Tilove
designed a pension policy under which a career employee of
state and local government was entitled to full replacement
of disposable income at the time of retirement. A career
employee was someone who had spent a full career in public
employment -- in this case, defined as 30 years. Disposable
income referred to net pay, after income-tax and Social
Security deductions. The employee would also have to be
age 65 at retirement to receive the full benefit. 3 ?
The report submitted to the governor and legislature at
the end of January was a highly technical and well-documented
work. It also made clear the Commission's judgments about
the guidelines set down a year earlier. One set of specifics
was that the normal retirement age of a "career employee"
should be pushed up to 65, with 30 years of service. Sec-
ondly, retirement benefits should have two explicit compo-
nents, Social Security and a pension paid by the state.
Third, there was the underlying idea that the total retire-
ment allowance should approximate 100% of pre-retirement
take-home pay, or, equivalently, about 80% of final salary.
This would be for the "career employee.38
The definition of the career employee concurred with the
original conclusions of the Moore Committee, which Kinzel
had echoed but not quite adopted in 1972. Kinzel also used
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as references what he took to be existing standards for pen-
sion benefits elsewhere: Social Security sets age 65 as the
normal age for receiving unreduced benefits, and in the maj-
ority of cases in private industry, age 65 was the normal
retirement age, and benefits received at younger ages were
often sharply reduced.
In calling for deliberate integration with Social Sec-
urity, Kinzel took the Moore report a step further. The
Moore report had in fact been contradictory in asserting
that while the two systems should be kept distinct, all sources
of income should be taken into account in evaluating adequacy.
If this second goal is to be effectively carried out, inte-
gration is evidently the logical implementation of the idea.
According to the report, one result of existing guide-
lines and definitions was that many long-service employees
retired with allowances greater than take-home pay. In a
survey of the 1061 members of the SERS who retired with
30 or more years of service in 1972, Kinzel found that each
one was receiving an allowance that exceeded take-home pay.
Social Security provided 30-40% of the retirement allowance
in these cases, and state pensions 60-70%. In its analysis
of employee retirement in the state's systems, the Commis-
sion concluded that a pension which amounted to 80% of
final pay would approximate net pay before retirement.
Using the above guideline and data, the Commission
designed a "Uniform Public Employee Retirement Plan." A
30-year employee retiring at age 65 would receive 80o of
final pay, or 100% of pre-tax income. Calculations would
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be based on service credit fractions, the Social Security
wage base,* years of service, age, and the final average
salary base. Therefore employees with fewer years of ser-
vice, retiring at younger ages, or with salaries exceeding
the Social Security wage base, would not attain the 80%
level of pay replacement.
There was another important component to the plan.
Policemen and firemen in the state would have a separate,
"special guaranteed retirement allowance." Standard retire-
ment would be after 20 years of service. The normal service
fraction for employees retiring before age 62 would be 2%.
Employees retiring at 62 years of age or later would receive
3% credit per year of service up to 20 years, and 1% for
each year of service thereafter. In this way, younger employ-
ees would be encouraged to work somewhat longer than 20
years, while older ones would be encouraged to leave upon
attaining 20 years of service.
In contrast, service fractions for all other employees
would not encourage employees to retire any earlier -- or
any later -- than age 65. For employees retiring ages 62-65,
service credit ranged from about 2.1% to 2 2/31 per year.
For retirement at ages 55-61, the fractions were 1 1/3 to
1 2/3% per year. But after age 65, there was at least no
decrease in the service fraction.
The Commission recommended that every pension plan in
the state close to new members. Its proposal would then
The maximum salary which is included in the calculation of
Social Security benefits and contributions (Tilove, p. 26)
- 33 -
be enacted to apply to all employees who began work for state
or local government after July 1, 1973. The report was sub-
mitted complete with a section that comprised the proposal
in bill form, appropriate for legislative introduction.
Kinzel unveiled the Commission's report and recommen-
dations in a press conference in Albany on January 30. The
proposal came largely as a surprise in Albany. Aside from
private actuaries, the Commission had consulted almost no
one who might conceivably have an interest in the proposal.
Two administration officials, Wilson and Levittwere the
official senior advisors to the Commission and had regularly
attended its meetings; and the Commission had received assist-
ance from Levitt's actuaries and computers. Other than that,
the Commission had not contacted legislators, unions, or
anyone else who would not only be interested, but could have
a great deal to do with the success or failure of the proposal. 3 9
In an interview with the press on February 4, Wilson
urged the Legislature to adopt Kinzel's full reform program.
According to Wilson, its two most important features were
probably the removal of pensions from collective bargaining,
and the prohibition of local government funding of pension
supplements not part of the existing retirement systems.
This referred to the union annuity funds in New York City,*
and the frequently made claims that payments to these funds
were unconstitutional.40
Two days later, Rockefeller also urged the legislature's
"full support" of the Kinzel plan. He cited the findings
of the recent Scott Commission report*, that pension costs
in New York City, including Social Security payments, would
reach almost $2 billion in fiscal 1980, triple the FY 1970
amount.
On February 7, Assemblyman Thomas Hanna, a freshman
Republican from the town of Webster, near Rochester, intro-
duced a bill to enact the provisions of the Kinzel plan.
At the time he was the bill's only sponsor, although Hanna
and Senator Fred Eckert, a supporter of the bill who would
later sponsor the Senate version, issued a joint statement.
The statement called for a halt to the acceleration of costs
to the taxpayers from public employee pensions.42
State Study Commission of New York City.
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Chapter II.
Immediately after Kinzel released the pension reform
plan, public employee unions in the state announced the
formation of a coalition to "do whatever is necessary" to fight
the reforms. The coalition, the New York State Conference
of Public Employee Organizations, was an outgrowth of the
consortium which a year earlier had lobbied unsuccessfully
for the D.C. 37 bill. John DeLury, head of the N.Y.C. san-
itation workers' union, was chairman, and remained promin-
ently in the lead of the coalition activities. Victor
Gotbaum was also one of the coalition's organizers and leaders.
Fifteen unions representing half a million workers in the
1
state immediately became members.
This time, coalition organizers were unsuccessful in
getting New York City policemen, firemen, and teachers'
unions to join. These groups had learned that they would
be better off if they stayed apart from other employee groups,
and relied instead on their traditionally favored position
with legislators. Also, personal and ideological conflict
kept Albert Shanker, head of the NYC United Federation of
Teachers, from joining an alliance formed by Voctor Gotbaum.
At the time, coalition members only commented that these
unions, would also come -to realize that their interests lay
2
with the general alliance.
The Civil Service Employees Association did not immed-
iately join the Conference. When the Pension Commission
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released its report, CSEA had attached the proposal for a
uniform retirement plan as "lacking in credibility" to wor-
kers. Because CSEA was so large, it was important that it
join the coalition. This took place within a week after the
original announcement. The coalition's size jumped to 750,000
workers in 16 unions, well over half the public employees
in New York. Unions agreed to contribute $20,000 each to
the coalition.
Gotbaum and Theodore Wenzl, CSEA's president, were
co-chairmen of the Conference. Ellis Van Riper, an official
of Transport Workers Union Local 100, was Treasurer. The
Secretary of the coalition was Harold Melnick of the Superior
Officers Council. Among the members of the Conference exe-
cutive board were chief officers of the N.Y.S. Police Con-
ference and representatives of state firefighters, NYC housing
police, NYC corrections officers, NYC transit police, state-
wide nurses, Teamsters, and others. This diversity was a
strength of the organization, showing solidarity and an
ability to unite behind a particular cause. Alternatively,
it was a weakness, foreshadowing problems..4
The Conference commissioned Program Planners, Inc., an
actuarial consulting firm, to prepare an analysis of the
Pension Commission's report and recommendations. The firm's
head was Jack Bigel, a close ally of Gotbaum and DeLury and
,a frequent union consultant.
The report, which was completed February 28, was an
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important tool for the unions in their attack on the Kinzel
plan. It criticized the three basic ideas of Kinzel's recom-
mendations: Integration of pension with Social Security; new
age and service limitations; and the guaranteed replacement
of pre-retirement take-home pay. Bigel's report also at-
tacked many of the assumptions, calculations, and methods
of the Pension Commission's report. 5
One of Kinzel's major assertions was that the 1972
amendments to the Social Security program would radically
change the nature of Social Security. These amendments
introduced automatic escalation of the wage base, according
to changes in the average covered wage. The Pension commis-
sion concluded that Social Security would become a pension
program in its own right. Frequent escalation of the wage
base, and periodic cost-of-living increases, would increase
Social Security payments to levels where they would provide
adequate income exclusive of local pension plans.
Bigel contended that Social Security benefits alone
were in no way adequate. Also, major pension plans throughout
the country were moving away from integration. In the Pen-
sion Commission's study, 33 of 50 state systems did not inte-
grate. In a Bureau of Labor statistics study, 62A of 93
major retirement plans supplemented, but did not integrate
pensions with Social Security. In 1958, and in 1972, 85%
,of the same plans were only supplemental. Bigel's report
did not mention, however, that Kinzel spoke of Social Security
- 41 -
taking on a greater role in retirement income only after about
20 years, at which time the reform plan would start to take
effect for most employees.
Regarding age and service requirements, the Conference
report first of all said that 65 had never been the stand-
dard retirement age, at any time in the history of public
pensions in New York. The present federal civil service,
which the Pension Commission implied it wastusing as a stan-
dard, used a normal retirement age of 55. Furthermore, a
service requirement of 30 years for a full pension ignored
what the Bigel report called "changes in the nature of public
service." This referred to job-related health and safety
problems. Sanitation and transit workers had health prob-
lems, which management had not always been willing to recog-
nize. Crime threatened the well-being of the police and
prison guards, the latter being a much lower status group
than the former. And, although the report didn't spell it
out in so many words, hospitals and schools were also unsafe.
The implications were especially important for teaching,
that presumably safe, genteel profession. The idea that
teachers would have to stay on for 30 and 40 years (although
this was not uncommon in the past) under "battleground"
conditions to collect maximum pensions was not an acceptable
proposition to the unions.
The Conference report also debated the Kinzel plan's
"guaranteed retirement allowance" of 80f% of final pay, or
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complete replacement of disposable income, even for employees
fulfilling its stricter age and service requirements. Ill-
ustrating the Pension Commission's formulae with specific
cases, the report found that the total pension, including
Social Security, only came to 80%, not 100%, of pre-retire-
ment disposable income, and three-fifths, not 80%, of final
salary.
The major reason for the discrepancy according to the
report, was that the Commission's own calculations were in-
correct. For example, the Pension Commission had understated
the working employee's disposable income before retirement,
by using incorrect federal tax amounts. Therefore, the
Commission's figures overstated the percent of income the
new pension plan would replace. The Conference report claimed
that the errors it found formed a pattern of understating
disposable income and overstating retirement income under
the proposed pension plan.
Regarding another one of the Kinzel plan's central rec-
ommendations, the union report objected to the proposal to
take pensions out of collective bargaining, and to the argu-
ment that pensions by their very nature were set apart from
wages and "other conditions of employment," as set down in
the Taylor Law. The report argued that quite to the contrary,
the courts and the National Labor Relations Board had clearly
established that pensions were deferred compensation, and
as such, within the proper scope of collective bargaining.
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The Conference report criticized in detail much more of
the Pension Commission's methodology and assumptions. One
such assumption was that current employees would not suffer
any pension reductions under the Pension Commission's recom-
mended plan. In theory this was correct. But if the new
plan eliminated temporary benefits as well, the loss of
the Increased-Take-.Home-.Pay policy would mean a pay cut of
4 to 8o for affected workers. With regard to benefits for
future employees under the proposed plan, the Conference
report complained that there were no side-by-side comparisons
in the Commission's report of amounts receivable under exist-
ing and proposed plans. The Conference report did develop
these comparisons. It found that for various jobs in state
and New York City government, the Uniform Retirement Plan
would give 351o-601 less to workers who retired before age
62, and 30/o-575 less for workers retiring above age 62, than
existing plans for each employee. (The comparisons only
looked at the state pensions, not Social Security). The
report also debunked the "special" advantages given to po-
licemen and firemen under the Uniform Retirement Plan. The
maximum payable would be 70o of salary, at age 62. The plan
would reduce pensions 52% below current levels for a 65/30
retiree, and 30%-38/, after 20 years of service depending
on age, up to 62.
Using data from the NYS Employees' Retirement System
for the year ending March 31, 1970, the union report found
an average total retirement income of $5253, 72% of final
salary for the 6828 retirees of that year. The report also
found that 1.02% of the New York City retirement systems'
members would be eligible for retirement benefits at 100%
or more of net salary. According to the union, these figures
meant that the incidence of benefits in excess of final salary
was infrequent, contrary to implications in the Commission's
report. Another criticism was that the Commission relied
'solely on outside sources for its figures on how much pensions
were going to cost. The Conference report then tore apart
the findings of those sources, principally a study done by
Prof. Raymond Horton for Citizens Union, a nonpartison civic
group in N.Y.C. That sudy showed pension costs in New York
City reaching $3 billion by 1982. This estimate was vastly
overstated, due to technical errors such as not including
compound interest, the union report claimed. In addition,
all studies used interest rates that were too low, when a
higher interest assumption which was closer to reality would
save the city $500 million in one year alone, in contributions
to the five actuarially funded retirement systems. The re-
port did not address the findings of another study commissioned
by the State Study Commission for New York City (Scott Com-
mission) and prepared by Prof. Bernard Jump in conjunction
with Syracue University. That study projected costs of almost
$2 billion by fiscal year 1980, assuming moderate salary increases.
Finally, the unions claimed that the Commission neg-
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lected "historical background" in the design of the Uniform
Retirement Plan, and in its comparisons of public and pri-
vate pensions. Industry pensions had been almost nonexis-
tent throughout most of the history of public pensions.
The Pension Commission was comparing a "mature" system with
one in its "infancy," and using as a model a class of insti-
tutions which was "derelict" in its responsibility to em-
ployees. Also, adopting the Uniform Retirement Plan would
set up a "two-tier" civil service, with newly hired employees
in the lower tier. This was also unprecedented, the report
claimed, and would cause racial conflict and poor morale.
The concept of benefit "tiers" would reappear later in the
legislative deliberations on pension policy.
The report was released on February 28. Earlier that
month, a number of labor representatives had attempted to
get consideration of "special deals" through aides of Gov-
ernor Rockefeller and the Republican legislative leaders.
Leaders of statewide organizations, including the NYC Central
Labor Council, the state AFL-CIO, and others, had advanced
these offers, which would include the D.C. 37 contract for
half-pay after 20 years at age 55. In return, unions would
drop their blanket opposition to pension reform.6
Rockefeller rejected the offers. At this point, he still
insiste'd on thorough re-design of pensions, which would pre-
elude setting up new pension plans for particular groups
of workers. He also continued to oppose the Gotbaum settle-
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ment.
There was some irony in this rejection. Rockefeller
had been instrumental in securing the increases in pension
benefits that would purportedly lead to fiscal disaster for
state and local governments, if not curtailed. This role
went back at least as far as 1959, when Rockefeller and Levitt
devised ITHP for NYC empl6yees in order to effect a tax-free
wage increase. It continued at least until 1966, when the
state employees career pension plan became noncontributory
under temporary legislation. Presumably, if only Rockefeller
would go along with a contract that had been negotiated in
1970, and that had been a major victory for low-status workers,
he would then be free to overhaul the system. Nevertheless,
the Governor evidently had decided to back the reform inten-
tions of his pension commission, in this instance.
Union representatives also met with Lieutenant Governor
Wilson, whose reputation was that of "friend to labor."
Wilson also refused to compromise. At one point, the labor
group accused Wilson of abandoning his former friends and
allies. Wilson contended that the unions were ignoring the
fact that reform really was necessary. He said that pension
increases were "bleeding" treasuries dry. Thusboth top
officials in the state were pressuring labor to accept pen-
sion reform.?
Paralleling events at the executive level, activity on
the pension reform issue centered around the legislature.
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Although the Administration had been quick to urge acceptance
of the Kinzel plan, legislators approached it warily. At
a meeting of the Republican-led Assembly Governmental Em-
ployees Committee, Kinzel discussed the Uniform Retirement
Plan. Seymour Posner, a Bronx Democrat and a long-time
champion of labor causes, engaged Kinzel in a "running debate"
on the plan. Posner contradicted the claim that Workers
fr.equently got pensions equal to 100% or more of spendable
income. 8
The Black and Puerto Rican Legislative Caucus said the
plan would set up a racially discriminatory "two-tier" sys-
tem. The chairman of the caucus, Assemblyman Samuel Wright
(Democrat of Brooklyn) called the Kinzel proposal a "'blue-
print for racial conflict and massive, brutal discrimination.'"
Since "nearly half of all new (public) employees are from
minority groups," the plan would effectively put minority
workers overwhelmingly in the lower "tier".
The opposition of the caucus was so strong that the chief
lobbyist for D.C. 37 later approached the caucus at the
request of the legislative leadership, to ask them not to
delay the state budget for this one issue. Despite the
unions' own opposition to the Kinzel plan, they judged that
a failure to enact a new budget on time would delay delivery
of exis'ting social welfare benefits, hurting people who could
,least afford it.9
Republican leaders, including standing-committee chair-
men, kept away from personal commitment either way. At
first no one in the Senate was even willing to sponsor the
bill, which the press by now was calling "the hottest item
of the 1973 session. The bill came in under Rules Committee
sponsorship in the Senate about one week after its Assembly
introduction. Several days later, Senator Fred Eckert intro-
duced an identical bill. Like Assemblyman Hanna,- Eckert
was a freshman Republican, from Greece, a town near Rochester,
and not far from Hanna's district. Efficiency in government,
and in particular, reducing the high costs of pensions, had
been a key issue in Eckert's election campaign. He attributed
much of the reason for his victory over the incumbent to
this one issue. Eckert's opponent had voted for all the
pension improvement measures of the 1960's. Eckert also
felt that his campaign had made people aware of the importance
of pensions. Eckert's sponsorship re-emphasized the unwill-
ingness of any of the more senior legislators to support
the measure. As one union leader said, no one else would
have had the guts. Most members of the-Republican majority were
waiting to s,ee what would happen in the public hear ngs gched-
uled for early March, before commenting on the bill.10
On March 1, the two legislative committees with uris-
diction over pension bills, Senate Civil Service and Pensions,
and As'sembly Governmental Employees, held a joint hearing.
Attendance was high. It included union leaders from all over
the state, country representatives, mayors, legislators,
business and taxpayer groups, and the Pension Commission.
Press coverage was considerable. This was the first public
hearing on the subject of public employee pension reform
since the establishment of the Pension Commission in 1971.
Kinzel and Metz both appeared at the hearing to explain
and defend the Commission's proposal. One of their emphases
was on the tremendous cost savings which would lead to lower
percentages of payroll spent on pensions. Members questioned
Kinzel for over three hours. Democratic Legislators
again attacked various aspects of the plan. Eckert spoke
in support, also concentrating on prospective cost savings.
Business group representatives were generally supportive.
The Empire State Chamber of Commerce spoke in favor, although
the plan was still "more generous" than industry. Associated
Industries, although without having studied specific propo-
sitions of the bill, supported the concept.1:2
Unions showed up in force at the hearing. Top union
leaders condemned the bill -- Ray Corbett, DeLury, Albert
Shanker, Dr. Wvenzl. Wenzl decried the Administrations'
heavy hand in the proposal, saying that its sponsors didn't
even understand it because the Governor's office had drafted
the bill. He may have been referring to the assistance of
Wilson and Levitt's aides to the Pension Commission. Cer-
tainly' authorship of the bill was the Commission's,not the
,sponsors, as with any Droaram bill.* Wenzl also spoke about
Legislation submitted by an administrative agency, usually
to accomplish some major program of that agency, i.e. gover-
nor's program bill, Attorney General's, Department of Envir-
onmental Conservation, etc.
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abuses among high-ranking employees that the Pens ion Commis-
sion did not address; for example, officials who retire on
good pensions and then work for the state as consultants. 1 3
After testimony had gone on for seven hours, largely
in opposition to the bill, above all from the many union
representatives, it was clear that the Kinzel plan could not
pass in its original form. The committee chairman, Senator
Schermerhorn and Assemblyman Suchin, said they would not
support the original bill, but would propose revisions based
on testimoney. Suchin questioned labor representatives
closely on acceptable alternatives which would also reduce
the acceleration of pension costs, to "prod them into coming
up with some proposals."1 4
The chairmen had to schedule another hearing, which
was held on Thursday and again lasted all day. Strong union
opposition to the Kinzel plan continued. However, another
interesting thing had also happened. Many unions had denounced
the plan, but had then asked for special treatment or exclu-
sions for their employees, in any plan that did pass. This
was especially true of police and firefighter organizations.
Another group like this was the Security Unit Employees
Council 82, AFL-CIO, representing 8000 corrections officers
and park police. Before the hearing, the union had said that
the age and service requirements for general members in the
Kinzel plan were a "life sentence for corrections officers."
At the hearing, the union asked that prison guards be granted
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the same "special" terms as police under the new plan. 15
Another incident was Levitt's slight deviation from
the Administration position, with the suggestion that perhaps
collective bargaining could continue, but on some sort of
"coalition" basis among groups of employers and employees.16
A small but real division had opened up within the
union camp, and within the Administration as well. These
paved the way for the design of a modified reform proposal.
After the second hearing, Rockefeller, Anderson and Duryea
agreed to set up an informal task force to devise a plan
that they could get through the Legislature. Charles Holcomb
of the Gannet News Service reported that the Republicans
intended to pass a weakened reform measure, and use it as
"a Republican issue, to be passed primarily with Republican
votes and used in 1974 as a campaign issue." He also said
that the modified bill would retain principal aspects of the
original. These included closing down existing plans; creating
a new uniform statewide plan to be administered by each re-
tirement system, for workers beginning July 1, 1973; taking
Social Security benefits into consideration in designing
state pensions; reducing benefits for workers retiring prior
to age 65; and ending pension negotiations between unions
and individual employers. Possible changes in the original
included giving prison 'guards 20-year retirement; protecting
firemen on special shifts from a 180-day minimum requirement
for service credit for any given year; preventing pensioners
from earning government salaries as consultants; and providing
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cost-of-living increases to retirees.
Unions continued the intense campaign to defeat the
plan entirely, and to influence any prospective agreement.
They argued against the Pension Commission's report, using
Program Planners' statistics. They emphasized that current
employees would lose out, contrary to what the Commission
said. In one incident, during talks with Wilson and Anderson,
sojne union staff members were so vehement that they completely
antagonized the Republicans, who later sent word that those
individuals should not participate in any more meetings. 1 8
At this point, toward the end of March, a different set
of negotiations became anymportant part of the pension fight.
These were the contract talks between the Civil Service
Employees Association and the administration. Until the
third week in March, Melvin Osterman, the state Director
of Employee Relations, had been handling the negotiations.
The Governor now intervened. In a private meeting with Dr.
Wenzl, he asked CSEA to abandon .the coalition and to
support a uniform retirement plan for public employees in
the new contract. In return, Rockefeller would see to it
that the temporary, non-contributory feature in the state
employees' retirement plan became permanent. The temporary
benefit was one of state's strongest points of leverage at
the tihe. Although press reports that the administration
,was using the issue of renewal of these temporary benefits
as a kind of threat to the unions probably exaggerated the
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issue, a permanent non-contributory feature would put CSEA
members ahead of all other public employees in the state,
regarding that one item.
In the announcement of a settlement with CSEA on April
10, the Administration claimed that it fulfilled the Kinzel
reform recommendations. The contract would raise the normal
retirement age for non-safety employees from 55 to 62, define
final average salary as the average of the three highest
earnings years, and impose a maximum benefit of 60% of final
average salary on the first $12,000 of earnings, and 50%
of salary in excess of 412,000. As part of the agreement,
the Administration would work to get these terms extended
to all public employees. The implementing legislation would
also prohibit any pension improvements prior to April 1, 1976.
And, although pension would still be collectively bargaining
"coalition negotiations" would take the place of separate
agreements between every government employer and its employees'
20
unions.
Coalition bargaining was supposed to counteract "leap-
frogging." It was a way for the Administration to avoid a
ban on collective bargaining, which would be a political
disastrous step that was probably illegal as well, but not
completely back down from the fight against leapfrogging.
The problem with it was that no one knew what it was or how
to implement it. The theory was that a coalition of un ions --
for example, all the police organizations in the state --
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would sit down with employer representatives. How this would
work out in practice was unclear. Would the P.B.A. from a
small upstate town join with the N.Y.C. P.B.A., and would
that town's officials sit down with the City administration
to bargain over pensions? Despite these uncertainties,
further development of the proposal did occur later in the
year.21
At the end of April, Osterman and his staff were working
on a bill to implement the CSEA contract. May 4 was the tar-
get date for introduction. Provisions of the bill would in-
clude a moratorium on pension improvements prior to April 1,
1976; coalition negotiations for pensions; and three new
retirement systems. One would be for teachers, one for police
and firemen, and one for all other employees. The Pension
Commission would have a mandate to invent a way to implement
coalition bargaining. One' idea was that the unions would
submit pension proposal to the Commissions. The Commission
would then conduct hearings and submit recommendations to
the 1976 Legislature. Possibly, the unions could be put into
bargaining regions -- such as one region for New York City,
and one for all other areas.22
The Administration did not actually submit its proposal
until May 14. It extended terms of the CSEA agreement to
all other workers, including a 20-year pension for police,
firemen, sanitation workers and corrections officers, equal
to 40o of salary, or 60o after 25 years. Transit workers
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and all other employees would have to work to age 62, and
complete 30 years of service, to get 60% of final salary.
The Pension Commission would have to submit a proposal for
coalition bargaining by December 1, 1974. The other part
of the Administration's bill contained the negotiated pay
raises for CSEA workers. The bill did not contain any sug-
gestions at all on what form coalition bargaining might take,
de.spite the ideas and rumors reported at the end of April.23
Supporters of pension reform criticized the Administra-
tion's agreement with CSEA. Senator Eckert contradicted the
Governor's assertion that the terms of the CSEA agreement
were consistent with the Pension Commission's recommendations
and that they "substantially achieve(d)" major reform object-
ives. According to Eckert, the Governor had "abandoned the
fight for meaningful pension reform." He was particularly
concerned thatfhe Governor's proposal did not integrate So-
cial Security with pensions. Similarly, Senator Schermerhorn
criticized the administration for failing to remove pensions
from collective bargaining. He said that a coalition would
put all public employees into a "pension bloc" with enormous
political power. Assemblyman Suchin noted that this was a
"partial rejection by the Governor and staff of the original
recommendations." 24
From a different perspective, unions also attacked the
,agreement. At a press conference in Albany, DeLury stated
that the Public Employee Conference would continue to fight
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against any new, reduced pension program, Kinzel's or any
other. Unions strongly denounced the proposal for extending
the terms negotiated by one union to all other workers.
Albert Shanker, of the N.Y.C. United Federation of Teachers,
called CSEA "an inept company union."
Conference members did not in fact
find CSEA's "defection" surprising, since they did not con-
sider CSEA to be a "real" trade union in the more militant
tradition of the N.Y.C. public employee unions.25
The Public Employee Conference now included 29 unions,
or virtually every union representing public employees in
New York, (according to data from the N.Y. State Department
of Labor, Directory of Employee Organizations), with the
possible exception of CSEA. New York City teachers, police
and firemen had evidently put aside their differences with
the coalition, for the moment.
Members of the Pension Commission first discussed the
contract with Osterman, who travelled to the Commission's
New York office at their request. The Commission then took
the unusual step of commenting on the contract in advance
of receiving formal notice of the implementing legislation.
This, the Commission stated in a short report, was due to
the seriousness of the impact of such a contract, if it were
to be implemented. Actually the Commission's nine page state-
hent was released to the Legislature on May 7 -- two weeks
after the original announcement, and three days after the
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scheduled release of the Governor's bill, which the Admini-
stration did not submit until May 14.26
In the statement, the Commission first outlined its
own proposal again, emphasizing the importance of "full inte-
gration with Social Security benefits." The Commission
approved of the pension provisions of the contract settle-
ment, raising the normal retirement age, redefining final
average salary, and the others, but said that "the proposal
does not meet the test of adequacy, uniformity and taxpayer
capacity... It preserves countless inconsistencies, ineq-
uities, special provisions and excessively generous benefits
of current plans..." The Commission's main criticism was
that continuing Social Security supplementation of pensions
does not take into account "the revolutionary changes made
in the 1972 Social Security program and the implications
of these changes 30 years hence..." Therefore, the Commission
said, the state would still be providing "excessively gener-
ous' pensions that amount to more income than pre-retirement
take-home pay. The statement also objected to permitting
normal retirement at age 62, since Social Security did not
provide full benefits until age 65.
Regarding coalition bargaining, the Commission reiterated
its position that public employee pensions should not be
subject to collective bargaining. Coalition negotiation was
,a "new concept," and the Commission had "serious reservations
as to how this procedure would apply to some 3000 public em-
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ployers throughout the State...", particularly, "whether or
not the process would be effective in halting the leapfrogging
syndrome..." Newspapers widely quoted the assertion that
the CSEA settlement, if passed, would "effectively doom"
the possibility for "meaningful reform." Also on May 7,
state workers voted their acceptance of the three-year CSEA
contract. The contract included $156 million in pay increases,
as well as a three-year pension moratorium, and reduced pen-
sion benefit. The pay increases would have to be implemented
by incorporation into the supplemental budget, before the
May 30 deadline. 2 7
The day of the bill's introduction, Rockefeller held
a press conference to defend the agreement with CSEA. He
said that he had written the bill in its present form,
attaching the wider pension reforms to the CSEA contract,
because the legislature had taken no action on pension reform
for the past two months, and the Kinzel bill clearly had no
chance of passage. He also implied that the CSEA might go
out on strike if the Legislature failed to ratify the bill.
Meanwhile, legislators said that they had waited for the
Governor to conclude the agreement with CSEA, at his request.28
The Legislature now had three major pension reform
bills to consider, the Kinzel plan, one sponsored by Senator
Schermerhorn along the lines of the Kinzel bill but more gen-
erous to corrections employees, and the Governor's. Legis-
lators immediately began working toward-a fourth, having
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been forced into action, but unable to ratify any of the
existing bills because of relentless pressure from the unions.
The two Republican leaders had no public position on reform.
Anderson was under pressure from his Binghamton constituents
to cut pension costs, and was in a relatively strong position
to direct a Senate vote. Duryea on the other hand, faced
an impasse in the Assembly. He had only 78 majority votes,
with 76 needed to pass a bill. Three New York City Repub-
licans were from marginal districts, and in danger of losing
their seats should they anger the public employee unions.
The Democratic minority leader , Stanley Steingut (from New
York City), had said he would "vigorously oppose" attempts
to impose terms of the CSEA contract on all workers. 2 9
Over the weekend following the introduction of the
Governor's bill, legislative leaders and aides planned a
compromise. In addition to the four top-ranking legislators,
Anderson, Duryea, Steingut, and Senator Joseph Zaretski
(Minority Leader), union leaders influenced the bill's content.
DeLury, Shanker, Bigel and others worked along with the leg-
islators.30
The leaders' bill.ratified the CSEA contract and put
a three-year freeze on public employee pension improvements,
beginning July 1. Duryea, under pressure from Democrats
and unions, deleted the omnibus provisions extending the
CSEA pension provisions to all public employees. The unions
also obtained an amendment protecting all existing temporary
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benefits, and any new ones that might be negotiated with
the New York City administration prior to July 1. The com-
promise bill passed both houses on May 23, 113-26 in the
Assembly, and 39-18 in the Senate. 3 1
The leaders' bill was clearly much weaker than the
Governor's own modification of the Kinzel recommendations.
Rockefeller protested that the bill was inadequate, since
the reforms did not apply to New York City employees. Wenzl
also protested that his agreement with the State was based
on the understanding that reforms would apply to all public
employees. The union coalition urged Rockefeller to sign,
referring to the Governor's possible try for a fifth term.
The Governor was in a difficult position. The current
proposal was a far cry from the universal reform recommen-
dations of the Pension. Commission. It also violated his own
agreement with Wlenzl. He began prodding the Republican
leaders to develop another strategy that had a better chance
of accomplishing real reform. On the 26th, Duryea and Anderson
accepted a compromise which would in effect delay consideration
of a reform package until a special summer session of the
legislature. Under the strategy, the legislature would first
close all the public employee retirement systems to new em-
ployees. It would establish a 7-member select committee,
with minority labor representation, to consider pension reform
,proposals, conduct public hearings, and make recommendations
to the Governor and legislature prior to the special session.
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The crucial section however, was to extend cost-of-living
pension increases, and ITHP benefits, both applicable mainly
to New York City employees, only until August 31, instead
of the usual one-year extensions of these temporary benefits.
The Governor, tongue-in-cheek, called this "an incentive for
action."33
Union leaders lobbied all day against the new measure,
unsuccessfully. Dozens of union officials watched from the
spectator's gallery as the Senate voted along partison lines
to approve the bill, late at night on the 26th. Tension was
high in the chamber. One of the members called the union
spectators "vultures looking down." Tonight's vote ended
unions' jubilation of less than a week earlier, at the pas-
sage of legislation which killed major pension reform.
On May 31, the Governor signed into law Chapters 382
and 383 of the Laws of 1973, ratifying CSEA's contract with
the state, and creating the Select Committee.34
The Select Committee was a vehicle for producing an
acceptable reform proposal which would stand a chance of
passage in the Special Session. The Pension Commission had
completely antagonized union and therefore scared the legis-
lators. Its opponents perceived the Commission as a group
dominated by the spokesmen and values of private industry.
The Pension Commission had never held public hearings or
otherwise solicited a range of opinions. The Kinzel plan
had received fierce criticism at the joint committee hearings.
In contrast, the Select Committee would hold hearings; had
labor spokesmen; and was appointed by legislative leaders.
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The members were almost all from downstate. The only problem
was the limited time, perhaps inadequate, which the Committee
would have to prepare recommendations, and which the legisla-
ture would have to review them. It seemed that the admini-
stration intended to force some more definitive action before
the outcry died away. The three-year pension moratorium was
also a strategic move. It relieved legislators of the need
to- consider pensions for the duration of CSEA's contract, and
undercut union prospects for ignoring coalition bargaining
(if that policy were ever to become a reality).
The CSEA negotiations was the other key to events at
this point, particularly after the Kinzel bill clearly would
not pass. Whether or not the Governor had requested leaders
to delay, the legislature did not take action on pension
reform until after the settlement. After the Legislature
had produced its version of a contract/pension reform package,
which gave in to NYC unions on.virtually every ground, the
Governor again took the initiative in working with Republican
leaders to put together a fifth and final proposal at the
regular session.
A Special Session would have certain advantages. Pen-
sion reform would be virtually the only topic discussed.
Legislators would have to focus their full attention on the
problem. The public's attention would also be on the reform
issue, a gamble that "taxpayers" would outnumber labor sup-
porters. The Governor would be in a stronger position,
since he no longer needed to bargain with the Legislature
in order to pass a new state budget.
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Chapter III
The Senate Majority Leader and the Assembly Speaker
each named three members to the Select Committee. Anderson
appointed Senator John Dunne, a Long Islander, Senator
Frederick Meyerson of Brooklyn, and Samuel Cantor. Duryea
appointed Assemblyman Clark Bell, a critic of the unions,
Julius Mintz, and Professor Walter Eisenberg of Brooklyn.
Meyerson and Eisenberg were the Committee's union represen-
tation.
The members met with Kinzel during the second week in
June. He reiterated the Commission's coninued support for
the original uniform retirement plan. The Committee that
week then chose as its chairman Judge Milton Alpert, who
had been a member o'f the Moore committee. Committee mem-
bers also met with Osterman, to hear the Governor's point
of view. The Legislature also provided the Committee with
several general counsel, and Rockefeller directed four of
his closest aides, including Osterman, to work with the
panel.2
The Committee held seven public hearings, June 20 through
June 29. Five were in.New York City, one in Rochester and
one in Albany. The Committee initially solicited testimony
from mayors and county administrators, including the Big
Six mayors*, in order to find out about the effects of pen-
New York City, Yonkers, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse and Albany.
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sions on local government budgets. It also invited the can-
didates for the New York City mayoralty to attend.)
Many familiar figures testified at the hearings. Osterman
and Kinzel gave the initial testimony at the opening hearing.
Each upheld his respective, and by now, familiar position.
Only one of the mayoral candidates accepted the invitation
to testify, Congressman Badillo. The two legislators in
the race, Assemblyman Blumenthal and Senator Marchi, were
more cautious. They said they preferred to look at the
Select Committee findings first. 4
Deputy Mayor Edward Hamilton represented Mayor Lindsay.
Hamilton demonstrated the city administration's continued
loyalty to the unions, criticizing the two major reform pro-
posals and blaming the Legislature for passing expensive
pension "extras" over the years. He also used the occasion
to urge the Committee to support the Gotbaum bill, the pen-
sion agreement negotiated between the City and D.C. 37.
The city administration thereby avoided jeopardizing its
standing with public employee unions, and defended its own
5
record.
Top union officials spoke at the hearings. Dr. Wenzl
tes-tified, mostly to point out how poor the retirees of
state Employees Retirement System really were. He said the
average' "zero option" retirement allowance was $3489 in 1971
Options may be elected in order to continue payments, to.a
dependent, after the retiree's death. If an option is chosen,
this reduces the pension from its maximum amount.
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and $4100 in 1972, with an average system pension of $2000
and Social Security payments of $1922 to $2100 annually.6
Officials from the Conference of Public Employee Organ-
izations also testified. Van Riper of the Transport Workers
Union was one of the more interesting of these. He said
that the unions had worked with the legislative leaders to
produce a "reasonable, realistic compromise," but "got
screwed." The Governor's compromise bill with the leader-
ship was "the knife in our back." Van Riper also quoted
statistics purporting to show the relatively modest pen-
sions that transit workers received: Average maximum bene-
fits of $8200 in 1972, an average retirement age of over
59 years, and about 27 years of service on the average.7
Bigel also presented data on current levels of benefits
for different workers, which reforms would presumably cut
back: $5830 for state policemen and firemen, and $6592 for
state teachers with 30 years of service. Albert Shanker
defended the retirement allowances of NYC teachers, whom
he said made average contributions of $25,210 toward their
pensions and received average maximum allowances of 841 of
salary. Shanker also said that corporate interests and the
newspapers which depend on them, were behind the drive for
reform. He called the CSEA a "weak organization," with
"terrible" and "incompetent" leadership.
DeLury said that the two-month extension of temporary
benefits was "blackmail" of public employees. If the new
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plan caused employees to lose any existing benefits, unions
would restore them through wages or some other means, DeLury
told the Committee. Victor Gotbaum defended the D.C. 37
contract once again. He said that the pensions called for
in the contract would be less costly than other similar plans,
due to the way they would be funded, although he did not
specify what this was. Accusations that the contract spec-
ified full salary after 40 years service were inaccurate,
although statistically, a few retirees might obtain it.
Gotbaum also accused Rockefeller of refusing to go along with
a Marchi compromise for contract ratification. This was
important because it would mean that the Governor, rather
than the Legislature, was responsible for the failure to ratify
the agreement.9
Gotbaum also said that "leapfrogging" was nonsense.
In the private sector, using the terms of another union's
agreement as a minimum bargaining base is called good pro-
fessional collective bargaining, but in the public sector
it becomes a "leapfrogging syndrome."
Employee representatives from all over the state spoke
as well, urging continuation of present benefits for future
employees, and for present employees, the extension of tem-
porary benefits, or their permanent codification.
Speakers from employer groups, citizens groups or re-
search organizations -- the groups had various names but
all belonged in the reform camp -- favored some form of re-
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duced benefits. Citizens Union was one of those which claimed
it had "no axe to grind," and criticized the Pension Commission
for not holding hearings or soliciting a wide range of views
in the design of its recommendations. The organization was
concerned about the high and increasing costs of pensions,
and cited the results of its own report, the same one that
Program Planners had criticized so strongly. Citizens Union
also found fault with data on the cost of pensions, and said
that neither the City nor the Pension Commission seemed to
have accurate data.10
The Select Committee duly delivered its findings to
the Governor and Legislature on July 15, having had two
weeks to go through the testimony and documents and produce
a report. The Committee members agreed that "steps should
be taken to reduce future costs"of pensions, but beyond that
statement the labor minority, Meyerson and. Eisenberg, parted
company with the rest."
The majority's major recommendation was, like Kinzel,
for uniform "retirement, disability and death benefits struc-
tures," while "those employed in emergency or hazardous
occupations" would have separate plans, also uniformly applied
throughout the state. The main reason for this, the committee
said, was to eliminate leapfrogging, i.e. oneupsmanship among
unions. The committee recommended a continuation of police-
men's and firemen's 20-year and 25-year half-pay plans.
However plans for new employees should base pensions on a
three-year final average salary, and limit the total retire-
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ment allowance which any individual could receive. The plan
for general employees, like the CSEA agreement, would have
higher age and service requirements than at present. Within
this group, the committee suggested that the Legislature
consider teachers separately, in view of the "profession-
alism" and other aspects of the job. Employees in "hazardous"
occupations should receive more liberal benefits than "gen-
eral" employees.
Heart disability benefits should be uniform statewide;
the Legislature should extend some temporary benefits as
always, but should consider making some of them permanent.
The Committee's statement noted that in the CSEA agreement
most temporary benefits became permanent for N.Y.S.E.R.S.
members.
Prof. Eisenberg disagreed with the majority finding
that two alternatives existed for decreasing future pension
costs, which were either to end temporary benefits for cur-
rent employees, or reduce benefits from their current levels
for future employees. According to Eisenberg, a study of
alternatives should begin with some questions about pension
policy, for example: Will pension savings cause unions to
look for ways to recapture benefits elsewhere, such as wages?
Are there alternative sources of savings on pensions? Are
any current benefits excessive, and how do you determine whether
a benefit is excessive? Do benefits now meet the needs of
retirees?
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To a great extent these questions restated a number of union
concerns. For example, Eisenberg said that pensions had
actually decreased as a percentage of the New York City bud-
get, while other costs had risen. Social welfare costs had
a far more dramatic impact on the operating budget, increasing
to over one-quarter of the total, while pensions declined
to below 71. State pension costs were also under 7% of
total operating expenditures. Therefore, reducing pensions
would not have much of an impact on the budget. Eisenberg
recommended another method of savings, that of allowing in-
creased interest assumptions of 5o and 5.5% on pension funds,
a move justified by ongoing improvements in public pension
investment portfolios. Secondly, Eisenberg recommended that
the Legislature make all future pensions contributory, in
order to give employees "a direct, refundable and interest-
earning stake in the pension system he enters," and to reduce
the government's share of the contribution. He also called
on the Legislature to continue existing, liberal plans for
N.Y.C. sanitationmen and transit employees, "and others sim-
ilarly situated" -- presumably, housing police and transit
police, and corrections officers.
Eisenberg disagreed with the majority that the pension
calculation should use a three-year final average salary
base. Instead, he had a scheme for using final salary but
requiring three years at grade for that to apply, in order
to prevent last-minute promotions which had the sole purpose
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of increasing the pension.
In other recommendations, the Committee majority felt
that Social Security integration was not currently feasible
although the members recognized the "substantial changes"
made by -the 1972 amendments to the Federal Social Security
Act. They would only say that "consideration should be given
in developing benefit patterns" for future public employees,
to the benefits those employees would receive from Social
Security. Nor would the majority make any recommendations
regarding coalition bargaining or the removal of pensions
from collective bargaining. Eisenberg, in contrast, stated
very strongly this position that pensions must be restored
to the "status of a subject for required employer negotia-
tion." He reasoned that this has been true in the private
sector for 25 years, and had been a state requirement offic-
ially since the Taylor Law. Collective bargaining was also
an interim step before Legislative approval -- implying that
it guarded against the Legislature's well-known irresponsi-
bility. Eisenberg also said that bargaining coalitions do
form in New York City, according to the needs of the differ-
ent employee groups in various situations. This flexible,
efficient process would end if new laws established perman-
ent, inflexible coalitions.
Eisenberg also disagreed with the recommendation to
extend the terms of the CSEA "second tier" to "all other
employees." CSEA got a contract for its own members by nego-
tiating on their behalf. For the state to impose the same
terms on other public employees "is to make a mockery of the
collective negotiation process in thepublic sector." He
said that two-tier benefit structures were unprecedented,
and destructive to employee relationships. The majority
statement presented examples of "so-called two-tier" pension
systems in the 1940's; and to the existence of the eight
actuarial systems themselves There was and is nothing ex-
ceptional about having more than one "tier" of benefits,
in the majority view.
In support of its general goal of reducing future pen-
sion costs, the committee majority cited data that it had
showing rising annual costs of pensions throughout the state,
and also noted the state Constitutional provision protecting
current members of retirement systems from benefit reductions
(Article V, Section 7). In Eisenberg's view, the data and
testimony before the Committee simply did not support many
of the majority's conclusions. Senator Meyerson, in another
dissenting statement, first concurred with Eisenberg's findings,
but went on to say that the committee had nowhere near enough
time and staff to carefully consider the information avail-
able, nor did the Legislature. The process was a farce.
The Governor was trying to "stampede" a decision through as
quickly as possible. This, Ieyerson said, was a strange con-
trast to Rockefeller's "giveaway" of tax dollars in 1966,
when certain pension systems were made non-contributory "in
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an obvious attempt to curry favor with certain ... unions."
Two other majority recommendations were that the State
adequately update supplementary pension payments for retirees,
to match the rise in the cost of living; and to expand the
Pension Commission so that it reflects "all appropriate inter-
ests."
The Select Committee report, not surprisingly, contained
nothing particularly new or radical. It was to be expected
that the Committee would make some statement in favor of
some 'broad reforms. The Committee also added support for
some conciliatory itens such as the permanency of benefits,
and pension supplements. There was no way to make any really
detailed examination of budgetary Impacts of pensions -- the
Committee had to take the word of the many local government
officials who spoke of the budgetary problems that pensions,
in particular, were causing. The Committee's work also
derived some more respectability from the presence of labor
spokesmen, although the findings of the two camps differed
greatly. Also the minority received an official platform
for its views that the Pension Commission failed to provide.
The Committee majority stayed away from the two most
dangerous subjects, Social Security integration and collect-
ive bargaining. To make a decision eitherjway would have
automatically tainted its other recommendations in the eyes
of one or the other group. The Majority's recommendations
were very close to the Governor's original proposal, with
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some additions and modifications of details. Thus, the
Committee essentially endorsed the earlier compromise.
The Pension Commission lost no time in commenting on
the Select Committee report. In a memorandum to the Governor
and Legislature dated July 19, Kinzel commended the Committee
for its correct articulation of the problem of "runaway
annual costs of public pensions to taxpayers at every level
of government." Despite this, the Committee "has failed to
recommend an adequate solution." The very item that the
Committee had not addressed, integration with Social Security,
was the only adequate solution. In this memorandum, the
Commission no longer mentioned the "leapfrogging" problem
or ending collective bargaining of pensions. The most cru-
cial part of reform evidentlywas now the Social Security
isse:
Neither the Select Committee nor the sponsors
of the 1973 legislation appear to be cognizant
of the escalating benefits in future Social
Security payments. Employees hired after July
1, 1973, retiring 30 years from now (2003),
would receive anticipated payments of $14,580
a year, according to HEWF estimates. (For a
married couple, maximum benefits would be
$22,870.) For these employees hired five years
from now (1978) and retiring 30 years later
(2998), the anticipated yearly payments would
be $18,300. (For a married couple, maximum
benefits would be $27,450.)
By not taking Social Security increases into account, and
by recommending the continuation of benefits scaled among
different classes of employees, "the Select Committee, in
effect, has endorsed the status quo." Employees would con-
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tinue to retire on pensions exceeding take-home pay. Kinzel
again urged the Legislature to enact more "fundamental"
reform. 12
Union coalition members immediately decried the commit-
tee's findings. This was not only because of the lesser
benefits proposed, but also for the effect the proposals
were having on the united front of organized labor. The
N.Y.C. P.B.A. president, Robert McKiernar),had testified
that "'(t)he- single most important consideration to a police-
man... is that he not be equated with a garbageman, or any
other city employee, with the exception of the firefighter .'"
Police and fire organizations in effect split with the rest
of the coalition, gratified by the Committee's decision to
recognize their members as "emergency" employees who were
entitled to better pensions than the rest of the workforce.
The only change the Committee had recommended was the
computation of pensions based on an average salary of the
three highest-pay consecutive years, instead of on final
year's salary including overtime. Officials from the New
York City PBA and United Firefighers Association (UFA) said
they would "negotiate" this provision with the Legislature.
The Metropolitan Conference of Police Associations (55,000
member officers) reported its satisfaction with the Committee's
proposal.14
Police and fire union officials were in Albany at the
opening of the 'special session on July 25, to maintain these
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separate, higher benefits. The officials by now appeared
to accept the three-year saverage salary base. According
to Robert McKiernan, the new salary base would only reduce
the average benefit by 5.5A -- and besides, in 20 years,
by the time officers started retiring, they could again
change the benefits. There was no explanation as to why
McKiernan's figures differed so much from Walter Eisenberg's
claim of a 14.1/ reduction in police and firemen's (and
sanitationmen's) pensions under the reform plan. Eisenberg's
main point, in fact, had been that emergency workers would
suffer the greatest losses. Although the data used is not
available for analysis, it may have been to McKiernan's
political advantage to go with the lower estimate -- the
Select Committee had recommended no other changes in bene-
fits, and police and fire representatives would probably find
it impossible to convince the legislature to remove even
that change. It would be better to assure the membership,
and the diehard reformers, that changes did not affect their
organizations greatly.15
McKiernan also announced that the PBA and UFA, by sup-
porting separate positions for their members, would be breaking
"parity" with sanitation workers. In the late 1960's, san-
itation workers had won new status, as members of the "uni-
formed forces" along with police and fire officers. Their
pension benefits as well, stayed in line with those of police
and firemen. "Parity" also meant that other employee groups
pegged their benefits to those unions', although at lower
%> levels. This action therefore would upset the hierarchy,am5
disrupt the normal pension bargaining process.1 6
Cognizant of these changes, John DeLury called the
Alpert committee's report a "political report, not a pension
report," designed "with the sole purpose of fractionalizing
the united opposition to maintain a barely adequate retire-
me-nt benefit structure." He said that unions would retaliate
in the elections, using their "campaign war chest" against
legislators who voted to reduce pension benefits. Public
employees were twenty per cent of the voting population in
New York, DeLury said, and the Conference of Public Employee
Organizations represented half of those workers. The Con-
ference officially rejected the Select Committee recommenda-
tions.17
Other union leaders spoke of the "indecent haste" with
which the committee had completed its report (although the
June, 1973 legislation had made haste inevitable); and again
warned of racial conflict and demoralization among workers,
which would lead to strikes. Albert Shanker said that NYC
and his union had negotiated their current benefits in 1969.
The government had an obligation to live up to the terms
of the agreement. Changes in the benefits now, especially
18
without negotiation, would be "outrageous and illegal."
At the same time, taxpayer and industry groups were
the mainstay of the pension reform effort. The publicly
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stated, highly emphasized concern of these groups was that
"skyrocketing" pension costs threatened to bankrupt state
and local governments. Associated Industries, in a letter
to legislators just prior to the session, warned of "munici-
pal bankruptcy," and cited increases in payroll costs from
10.9fo to 22.5f% of payroll in 8 years, for NYS ERS. They
used Kinzel's figures on Social Security payment estimates,
to. prove that pensions would be more than adequate if merged
with Social Security. A New York Times editorial at the
same time said that prior reform efforts had "wilted before
the heat of union pressure," while rises in pension costs
exceeded those of any other cost in government including
education and welfare. Benefits also exceeded those in pri-
vate industry, the editorial said. 9
The unstated fear of the private reform groups was that
workers in private industry would demand benefits equivalent
to the more liberal ones of civil servants. Unions had act-
ually cited this as an ulterior motive of the reformers,
early in the regular session. They did not continue to use
this argument; it may have been too threatening an ideology
to use: Legislators might have started agreeing with reformers.
Unions concentrated throughout the session on proving the
unfairness and inadequacy of the reform proposals. In a
later year, in opposition to a more ambitious Pension Com-
,mission proposal, unions would attempt to show that NYC/NYS
benefits were actually inferior to total benefits provided
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by a number of large, private-employer plans, including such
corporations as IBM and Citibank. 2 0
In the legislature, Senator Anderson masterminded the
86-page bill packaging pension reforms applicable to dif-
ferent employee groups. The changes followed the Alpert
Committee recommendations almost to the letter, to the ex-
tent of making certain changes where the Committee had had
no. specific recommendations but did provide guidelines.
For example, employees in "hazardous" occupations (sanitation,
transit and corrections) would only receive 2% service credit
for 20 years of service, instead of the current half-pay
at 20 years. Transit workers would also have to be at least
age 55. Only at 25 years could these employees get half
pay. These measures reduced those employees' benefits with
respect to "emergency" workers. 2 1
For teachers and general employees, the bill raised
the normal retirement age to 62, from 55. But teachers
could retire at age 55 with no reduction in benefits, provided
they had worked for 30 years. General employees could retire
at age 55 with reduced benefits. 2 2
The legislation imposed a maximum benefit on policement
and firemen, in that it would not credit any service after
30 years. Previously there had been no maximum. The maxi-
mum benefit for all othe4lorkers, except teachers, was defined
,as 601 of salary up to $12,500, plus 501 of the remainder
if there were any. Previously, only general employees outside
of NYC had had a benefits limitation, of 75% of salary.
Teachers continued to have no maximum. The significance
of the $12,500 figure was that it was the current Social
Security wage base. Thus the bill made a minimal concession
to integration although it would immediately become out-of-
date when the wage base increased. 2 3
The only change applying to all employees was the new
three-year average salary base, where in most cases the final
year's salary had applied, and for some workers, the last
day's salary rate.
In one of the few positive notes for employees, the
bill proposed to increase pension supplements for pre-1958
retirees. These employees were ineligible for Social Security
since New York State and City had not participated in Social
Security until that year.
The pension reform bill was on members' desks in the
legislative chambers at 3 P.M. on July 26, the first bill
of the special session. Governor Rockefeller delivered a
Massage of Necessity to both houses, a legal device to enable
a vote on the bill without the mandatory three-day "aging"
period which was ordinarily supposed to give members time
to peruse legislation. (This system always broke down any-
way during the last week or so of the normal session, when
the legislature would pass the majority of bills.) In the
Senate debate on the pension bill went on for thre-e hours;
for four hours in the Assembly. Democrats argued along the
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familiar lines of discrimination against minorities, bad
morale in the ranks and strikes. Meyerson was among the
more outspoken members in the Senate. Democrats attempted
amendments to increase interest rate assumptions to 5fo,
which Republicans defeated. Democratic leaders in both
houses called the bill "an illusion of reform," which would
have a minimal effect on government fiscal problems around
the state. Supporters said that the changes would save J600
million in state and local contributions in the next ten
years (Kinzel had said his plan would save $750 million).2 4
The Legislature passed the bill in votes that generally
followed partisan lines, 37-22 in the Senate at about 10 P.M.,
and 88-55 in the Assembly, at 11:30 P.M. The special session
adjourned Tuesday, July 31.
Controversy did not end after adjournment. Business
groups said the changes were "inadequate," and a New York
Times editorial practically dismissed the legislation as
being hardly "reform" or a "plan." In agreement, ironically,
with Democrats, the editorial said that savings would .be
modest, certainly at first.- The Times did allow that the
action contrasted with the "disgraceful neglect" of pension
reform during the regular session. But, the reform was still
only a "bare minimum," which "inordinately strong" unions
were already threatening to undermine.2 5
DeLury said that NYC unions were planning a strategy to
alleviate financial losses due to pension reform. First
they would bargain for rioncontributory pensions for all city
workers, and possibly ask for increased fringe benefits.
"We will shortly demonstrate the impact of coalition bar-
gaining -- and I mean impact," DeLury said.26
NYC officials said that the bill could cost the city
more money than it saved, because it credited pensions to
part-time workers for the fist time. Savings could amount
to- $10 million in the first year (of which $6 million would
reduce tax levies); and could cost $15 million, for coverage
of a $200 million payroll of part-time employees.27
A week later the Times had considered its position
some more. An editorial entitled "Pension Hodgepodge" said
that the reforms were not uniform or fair, but manipulated
unions against one another "in cynical fashion." The Gov-
ernor was behind the strategy to divide and weaken labor,
the Times said, in particular with the aim of holding back
D.C. 37, the union of the City's lowest paid workers, in
order to let CSEA, "his favorite union in the state service,"
move ahead.28
- This was a curious variation on the Times' usual theme,
especially in comparison with its editorial of only a week
earlier. But the article made an important point about the
reforms: They preserved and reinforced the complicated
hierarchy of benefits assigned according to job character-
'istics and union political power. It is interesting to con-
trast the changes made with the more stringent but far more
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uniform Kinzel Commission recommendations. Certainly, Com-
mission members, some of them, looked on private industry
as a model and had little liking for the militant New York
City unions. But the Kinzel plan based benefit structures
on what it termed "management objectives." This meant that
retirement benefits were not a reward for service for employ-
ees in arduous or dangerous jobs. On the other hand, pensions
may provide early retirement for policemen and firemen because
the job demands younger employees. It is questionable whether
even this management objective should affect the pension
benefit structure in any way, the Commission said. But
given that has done so for a long time, it may remain, but
ideally extends to no other employees. 9
The Governor had finally succeeded in imposing a mea-
sure of his will on the Legislature. He had fulfilled his
pledge to CSEA. If he had not managed to look as if he were
really backing the Pension Commission, at least he had not
totally abandoned pension reform -- and private industry
demands. Should he choose to run again, Rockefeller could
look like a fiscal conservative. The effect on organized
labor was not so clear. He had isolated police and fire
unions, always jealous of their special position, from their
less privileged counterparts in the coalition. He had quashed
D.C- 37's efforts to bring its members closer to the level
of benefits enjoyed by all other city workers. But the coali-
tion remained active and strong in numbers, and determined
to fight further reforms or to repeal the new ones. Signi-
ficantly, the rest of the New York City unions (besides police
and fire) seemed to be staying together. A concerted effort
by the coalition could conceivably block future efforts to
reform pensions, or even to implement the new law, through
legal action.
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Chapter IV
The 1974 elections produced a Democratic sweep of state-
wide offices in New York. Former Congressman Hugh Carey
(Brooklyn), won the gubernatorial race (along with his running-
mate, Mary Anne Krupsak of Buffalo), defeating Rockefeller's
protegel, incumbent Governor Malcom Wilson. Before, Carey,
Rockefeller had served four terms as Governor. In the Leg-
islature as well, Democrats gained new power, capturing the
majority in the Assembly. This was the first time that
Democrats held the majority in either house since 1965-1968,
but before that, Democrats had been out of power in State
legislature since the end of the Second World War. The
former minority leader of many years standing, Brooklynite
Stanley Steingut, became Assembly Speaker. Duryea switched
places with Steingut and became Assembly Minority Leader.
The Senate remained under the firm control of Warren Anderson.I
Public employee unions had actively supported the Dem-
ocratic candidates in the election. Unions, particularly
New York City ones, expected that the new Administration
would be far more accomodating to their needs than the pre-
vious one. A legislature with one Democratic-controlled
house should also help to produce progress on union issues.
These were not unreasonable expectations. Unions in
New York tend to identify with the Democratic party, and
vice versa, and both receive their greatest support from
downstate voters. Unions have far more impact in New York
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City politics, than in the more sparsely populated upstate
communities.
This reality is what Victor Gotbaum had in mind when
he announced that New York City and D.C. 37 would again
attempt to gain passage of the November, 1970 pension contract,
despite the three-year pension moratorium. It was also the
basis for one of Carey's first actions as Governor, the
attempt to abolish the Permanent Commission on Pensions by
eliminating its budget and repealing its enacting legislation. 2
Neither of these attempts to benefit public employee
unions were successful. Despite the "change in political
climate," pension reform, instead of fading away, became
an even stronger issue. The Pension Commission survived
to follow through on its initial reform attempts. By 1976,
unions were fighting even harder, not for new benefits, or
even to regain what they had lost, but to prevent even greater
pension losses. The immediate explanation for this involves
the actions of the Legislature, the Kinzel Commission and the
Rockefeller administration. In addition, three inter-related
factors are crucial. These were the pressure put on govern-
ment by private industry and citizens groups for reform;
very thorough press coverage of pensions, including editorial
comment; and government fiscal crisis, particularly that of
New York City, which led to a new awareness of the problems
that pensions cause. All of these continued the momentum
for pension reform, through 1975 and the 1976 legislative
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session. The 1976 session was important because the pension
moratorium was expiring that year, as were the "Tier 2"
pension plans created in 1973.
From 1972-1975, a number of groups did major studies
of New York pensions. Two of these, released in late 1972,
examined the growth in New York City pension costs from the
perspective of private industry. The Economic Development
Council of New York City, an industry-funded research organ-
ization, reported on changes in public employee pensions
from 1960-1970. Its findings were based on a study orf 216
state laws passed during that time, and of collective bar-
gaining agreements. The Council detailed the benefits that
different employee groups in N.Y.C. were entitled to, and
concluded that pensions had "gone out of control" due to
union leapfrogging. The report recommended that the city
revise its current policy of widely varying benefits among
different employee groups, and that it provide uniform benefits
among all employees. It also said that city pension benefits
greatly exceeded those in private industry, and that annual
costs to the city were probably equivalent to 25% of payroll.3
The Task Force on N.Y.C. Pension Plans of the New York
Chamber of Commerce also criticized the city for giving em-
ployees overgenerous pensions, particularly in the uniformed
services. Policemen, firemen, transit workers, and others
were eligible for "three-layer cake" benefits, consisting
of the pension, Social Security, and a city-financed union
annuity. Accelerating pension costs were "draining the city
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of money and services," the report said, and the city should
refrain from granting any new pension improvements for cur-
rent employees. It should also set up a new, less generous
system for all future employees. 4
A third report in 1972 written for the state Fleischmann
Commission* was on the NYC Teachers Retirement System. The
authors, Frederick O'R. Hayes, former NYC bedget director,
and Donna Shalala, a political scientist, examined the costs
of the pension provisions in the city's 1969 contract. They
criticized city officials for agreeing to the pension'benefits
without being aware of total future costs. The report gener-
ated a small controversy. A spokesman for Mayor Lindsay
implied that the present Comptroller, Abraham Beame, was res-
ponsible for the contract. Beame, who hadn't been comptroller
in 1969, was furious. School board members, who had agreed
to the contract, said that they used police and fire-department
contracts as guides on benefits. They also said that "high
city officials" had provided the information on contract
costs.5
Other reports predicted future increases in pension
costs. One was Prof. Raymond Horton's study for Citizens
Union, which that organization used to advocate public pen-
sion reform at the hearings in 1973 before the Select Com-
mittee on Pensions. Another 1973 report was issued by the
Established to study the quality, cost, and financing of
public education in New York.
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State Study Commission for N.Y.C. (Scott Commission), written
by Prof. Bernard Jump, an economist at Syracuse University.
Prof. Jump's report predicted "enormous" pension cost in-
creases for the coming year of $299-317 million, or 37-39%.
These would bring the total to $1.105 billion-$1.123 billion.
By 1979-80, New York City retirement and Social Security
costs would be in the range of $1.126-1.991 billion. Reasons
for the increase were hiring of new workers, salary increases,
and new pension benefits. The last-named item included new
formulas for final pay, mandated Social Security increases,
and the 1970 20-year plan for teachers, which Prof. Jump
called "'one of the largest unconditional commitments of city
funds in the history of American city government.'" 6
Two years later, in the spring of 1975, the Scott Com-
mission released another report written by Prof. Jump, with
new estimations of 1980 pension costs using several sets of
assumptions about salaries and employment. His findings
will be discussed in greater detail with the events of the
1975 legislative session. 7
A report begun in 1975 and completed in 1976 for the
Mayor's "Management Advisory Board", produced detailed findings
on the funding and actuarial assumptions of the New York
City retirement funds. The discussion of this report also
belongs with a later section on political developments.
Although this study and the others done under the aegis
of state commissions are not "private" reports, they deserve
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mention here because all these reports, and the circumstances
which produced them, helped publicize the pension issue.
They also demonstrate that a number of vocal groups were
aware of pension costs and concerned enough about them to
conduct research on the causes of cost increases, future
costs, and on policies that would slow the increases.
Although most of the research centered on New York City,
where the scale of the problem was so impressive, fiscal
problems also affected smaller cities upstate. The state
constitutional limit on real property taxation threatened
the abilities of some local governments to pay for pensions
after March 1974. Until this time, certain cities and school
districts were accustomed to computing tax rates which in
reality exceeded the Constitutional limit. A state law
passed in 1969 allowed Rochester, Buffalo and Yonkers to
exempt the costs of retirement benefits from the tax limita-
tion (Local Finance Law, Section 11.00, (a) (42-a)). The
rationale given in the law was that the "period of probabl9
usefulness" of the pension expenditure exceeded the one-year
term of the operating budget. In a decision in Hurd v. the
City of Buffalo (41 A.D. 2d 402), the state Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of a lower court and declared this
practice unconstitutional, insofar as it excluded the City
of Buffalo's future annual payments for pension and retire-
ment liabilities from the tax limitation in the Constitu-
tion (Article VIII, Sections 10 and 11). The court said that
the constitutional provisions "involve a unified and inter-
dependent plan to control the taxing and debt-contracting
power of local governments, and "specious devices to evade
them would nullify their.effect." Further, the court said
that "no retirement or pension plan is actuarially valid
unless the annual amortization reflects the current burden"
of pension payments and reserves. Therefore, it is not ap-
propriate to "shift to future generations" the current bur-
den. The tax and debt-contracting limitations exist to pre-
vent just that practice. 8
In a dissenting opinion, one member of the court wrote
that Section 11 authorizes exclusion from the limitation
imposed in Section 10, by allowing statutory determination of
a "period of probable usefulness." Since the legislature
had determined in this case that the period for pensions
shall be three years, the law was valid. The opinion implied
a recognition of the reality that Buffalo and other cities
and school districts could not meet annual costs within the
tax limit without heavy service cuts or new taxing powers. 9
The legislature then passed a law similar to the one
declared unconstitutional in order to escape an immediate
crisis. The new law also faced a court challenge on consti-
tutional grounds.10
During 1974-75 Buffalo and Rochester both experienced
severe problems in meeting pension obligations. At the time
of the Hurd decision, Buffalo's pension contributions were
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"nearly equal the city's annual tax revenues." In 1970,
Rochester had negotiated a contract with city policemen and
firemen which was to provide them with new retirement benefits
beginning in April, 1972. Under law existing in 1970, those
costs would not have to be accounted for in the budget until
1974. Since 1970, a new law required immediate budgeting of
pension obligations (Section 430, Retirement and Social Sec-
urity law). In 1972 Rochester was obliged to ask the legis-
lature for an exemption for that fiscal year. This passed,
over the objections of the Pension Commission, which'saw
it as an "undesirable precedent."
Throughout this entire period, the press in New York
state provided thorough coverage of public employee pension
issues. Certain papers and reporters followed pensions esp-
ecially closely. The New York Times and the New York News
published dozens of articles each year, in which they reported
on alleged corrupt practices, outlined the costs of the city's
retirement systems according to latest estimates and explained
the various pension studies. They followed the work of the
Pension Commission, reported in detail on legislative action
on pensions, and provided a flood of coverage on the 1973
reforms.
In the Capital area, legislative reporters for the
Albany Times-Union and the Knickerbocker News regularly
covered pension politics. Charles Holcomb of the Gannett
News Service Capital Bureau, an authority on pension issues,
- 9b -
was extremely influential. The Gannett chain owned many
smaller newspapers around the state which printed his articles.
Rochester and Buffalo dailies, the Times-Union, the
Democrat and Chronicle, and the Evening News (Buffalo) also
covered pension issues. Both cities were having difficulties
in paying their pension bills; pension reformers Senator
Echert and Carl Stevenson were from Rochester and received
coverage in the local press.
Virtually all the newspapers adopted the same attitude
toward pensions. This was the perception that pensions were
a unique problem for government. Pensions, as opposed to
any other costs, were bankrupting government; pension plans
for public employees were too generous and richer than pri-
vate ones; and unions were grasping, greedy and too powerful.
These perceptions were especially clear on the editorial
pages. For example, in 1973, a string of editorials accom-
panied reports on the Kinzel reform plan and on activities
of the legislature and the Governor. Two Times editorials
in February and April aimed their ire at New York City unions,
and at city officials. Both the city and the unions were
"reckless" in pushing pension costs to "astronomic heights,"
regardless of the "fiscal soundness" of government budgets.
"Demagogic" unions engage in a "viciously competitive,"
"me-too scramble" to devise "new grabs," bu using the "coer-
cive pressure of strikes." "Union-cowed" legislators avoid
taking the initiative to provide "fundamental pension over-
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haul. "12
A Daily News editorial in July prior to the special
legislative session advocated the Kinzel Commission's uni-
form retirement plan for pensions, integrated with Social
Security and insulated from collective bargaining. "Bloated"
unions "browbeat local officials" and have caused a "disast-
rous drain on the public purse," the editorial board said.' 3
The Buffalo Evening News, after the joint committee
bearings in March, 1973, objected to the "cheap-shot neg-
tives" that critics of pension reform used. Pension'reform
is intended to end "abuses" and "pension extravagance," but
public employee pressure threatens it with "being gutted or
left in limbo." The Kinzel proposal will "remove any temp-
tation by elected office holders to give away the moon, with
pension IOUs they won't be around to account for." And if
legislators' "spines need stiffening," they can reflect
on "bankrupt state and local governments." 4
A Rochester Timjes-Union editorial in February 1973,
right after the release of the Kinzel reform plan, called
on legislators to "derail the gravy train of N.Y. public
pensions." Again in June, an editorial outlined the devel-
opments of the session just ended. Although the Pension
Commission had "recommended closing the current overly gen-
erous" systems, Rockefeller had "abandoned" its recommendations.
The legislators had "bowed to pressure" from unions and
"copped out" on pension reform at first, but afterwards
"tried to redeem themselves with the taxpayers."' 5
The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle warned that "pension
costs could scuttle our state," and if not reduced, "confis-
catory tax levels or diminishing services" would result.
State legislators weren't as concerned as they should be
partly because "their own political and monetary profit is
involved." All employees deserve a "fair pension" but the
system now allows "overblown pension benefits for tiddly-
wink jobs." Although "civil servants for many years were
underpaid and abused, the remedy for that is fair salaries
,.16
and good working conditions," not "excessive pensions.
Members of the Pension Commission, particularly the
Chairman, Otto Kinzel, attempted to establish good working
relationships with the press. Kinzel kept in close touch
with a number of reporters and editorial writers, and "edu-
cated" them about pensions. Certain reporters and papers
were more important. The editorial staff of the Times and
News, were highly sympathetic to the reformers; and a number
of individual reporters were also very useful.' 7
The effects of press coverage, research reports, lob-
bying, and government fiscal problems all contributed to the
continuing importance of pension reform in state politics.
This was especially crucial in the early part of 1975.
Governor Carey's first budget proposal, submitted to the
Legislature at the end of January, eliminated the appropria-
tion for the Pension Commission. The Governor also submitted
a bill(introduced as a budget bill in both houses; Seymour
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Fesner sponsored a similar bill in the Assembly) to repeal
the act which created the Commission (Article 27, Executive
Law). If the Commission's appropriation were not restored,
and included in the state budget (which had to pass by March
31 to begin the new state fiscal year, or July 1 for the
supplemental budget), the commission would effectively cease
operations. If the bill to abolish it passed, the commission
would go out of existence.1 8
The Pension Commission in many ways had been a thorn
in the side to Democrats. It advocated changes and forced
consideration of issues which did not normally concern them,
and angered their union supporters. Democrats also looked
on the Commission as a Rockefeller institution, with a pur-
pose and nature alien to a Democrat administration. New
York City legislators were in an especially awkward position.
They could ill afford to offend unions which represented many
of their constituents and were active in election campaigns.
The Kinzel Commission forced them to take sides on an issue
that purported to save "taxpayers" millions of dollars. Leg-
islators could hardly be against "pension reform," but to
be for it would be to side with upstate conservatives who
normally stood for everything New York City Democrats were
against.
The Governor explained that the Commission's work was
,completed, since the enactment of the 1973 reforms. Desig-
nated staff in his office could handle pension affairs in
the future. These statements plainly contradicted the
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raison-d'etre of the Commission, which had been to set up
a permanent body to report on pensions and deliver opinions
independently of the Governor's office or the Legislature.1 7
Carey apparently underestimated the support among both
politicians and the public, and the Commission's own ability
to mobilize its supporters. Kinzel immediately contacted
his friends in the press "to build a counterfire," and asked
Steingut and Anderson for their support. Senator Anderson
had already criticized the Governor's action in a press
release, in which he said that Carey's action was a "politi-
cal favor" to labor unions. Carey had forgotten his promise
to taxpayers, Anderson said, but not to Gotbaum. 2 0
The "counterfire" in the press was considerable. It
included extensive coverage of the Administration's attempt
to abolish the Commission and of subsequent legislative dev-
elopments. Several editorials denounced the attempt and
ascribed ignoble motives to it. The Buffalo Evening News
spoke of "the notably mush-in-mouth tone" that Carey adopted
toward "further public employee pension grabs," after NYC
unions supported his candidacy. The reasoning that the
Commission had completed its work "indicates either a woeful
ignorance of the facts, or else a convenient alibi for kow-
towing to the downstate power combine." "(T)he prime payoff"
is to be the abolition of a commission which has obstructed
,the unions' "pension-grab extravaganza": "a terrible public
disservice." 21
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A Daily News article around the same time adopted an
even greater tone of outrage. Calling the Governor's pro-
posal "The Great Pension Heist," the News said:
It is becoming increasingly -- and disgustingly --
clear that members of the State Legislature are
willing accomplices in Gov. Hugh Carey's plan to
give public employee raiders free access to the
public treasury.
Carey's part of the scheme was to snip the wires
to the burglar alarm -- the State Pension Commis-
sion -- by cutting off the panel's finds.
We though it suspicious at the time that the law-
makers failed to echo Commission Chairman Otto
Kinzel's outcry over the Governor's transparent
sellout to his civil-service friends. Now the
reason for their clam-up is apparent.
No sooner had the governor given the signal than
a flood of bills granting fatter retirement goodies
to favored public servants poured into legislative
hoppers. From a politician's standpoint, CAREY
AND HIS COHORTS -- have devised an ingeniously
stealthy plan to commit what could be the perfect
crime. By simply axing the commission's budget
line, the governor gave the legislators an oppor-
tunity to abolish the commission merely by doing
nothing.
Thus they can accomplish their purpose without
leaving any record-vote fingerprints the public
could use to identify the culprits.
For the caper to succeed, all that Carey & Co.
need is for New Yorkers to remain blissfully sleeping
while the brazen payoff of the union bosses is
carried out. They must be smirking and gloating
over the so-far torpid reaction.
Even the release of a report, commissioned by
the Kinzel group, which showed that New York City
alone now pays out $1.2 billion -- about one-
tenth of its entire budget -- for pension benefits
failed to arouse the snoozing citizenry.
The people had better soon wake up, screaming.
Unless they do, the State Pension Commission will
die by default -- and with it their only defense
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against further pension grabs.
The deadline, taxpayers, is -- appropriately en-
ough -- April 1. So start hollering, folks, 22before the Albany Hill mob makes fools of us all.
to
The News' metaphors of a gang of thieves, refer to
unions and legislators, with the taxpayers their sleeping
victims, was very picturesque. It was also accompanied by
a news photo of Carey that, together with the article, does
conjure up the image of a frowning gangster. The editorial
was not entirely accurate. To formally abolish the Commis-
sion, the Legislature would also have to pass one of the
bills repealing Article 27. Secondly, the Legislature was
not quite as quiet as the article supposes. One reason for
this was the report mentioned in the editorial, which the
Commission released in the midst of the controversy over
its existence. In the report entitled Financing the Public
Pension Systems-Actuarial Assumption and Funding Policies,
the Commission warned that the five NYC actuarial retire-
ment systems were so poorly funded that they could run out
of reserves for making current pension payments. This sev-
ere underfunding, the report said, was due to recently-
enacted benefits increases, which instantly created unfunded
supplemental liabilities; and to the city's tendency to
"cheat" on its contributions to the funds. The Commission's
study found that the percentages of funded liability assoc-
iated with active members had fallen by very large amounts
in three of the city's retirement systems between 1967 and
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1973. For the Employee's Retirement System, this percentage
fell from 50% to 13%, in the Teachers' Retirement System,
40% to 9%; and in the Board of Education system, 44% to 15%.
The policemen's and firemen's systems were 16% and 19% funded,
falling from 23% and 20%- respectively. Aside from a defi-
ciency in city contributions, the report also blamed the use
of certain actuarial assumptions which were extremely outdated
and therefore underestimated the necessary contribtuions.2 3
The Commission, which had been working on this report
since the previous fall, released its findings at a very
opportune time. One interesting thing about the report was
that none of the information regarding actuarial assumptions
was new -- it had all been reported year after year by the
city actuary in his reports to the retirement boards of the
different systems. The boards had consistently chosen not
to act on the information. The difference here was that
the city actuary was not an independent entity conducting
his own campaign for pension reform. The Commission was a
political body, engaged in fighting not only to survive,
at the moment, but continually, to impress its vision of
pension reform on the state. Government officials couldn't
exactly sit back and say that they had heard it all before,
and dismiss it; nor could the unions, who also had represen-
tatives on the boards.24
Another interesting point was that the data and conclu-
sions in the report went practically unquestioned at the
time. One exception to this was the response of Deputy Mayor
James Cavanaugh, who said that the retirement systems' assets
of $7-8 billion would last at least 25 years. The report
did go into some detail on how the outdated assumptions dif-
fered from modern experience, and on the "fiscal gimmickry"
that city officials used to reduce annual contributions still
further. For example, the pension funds earned a rate of
interest on their assets which was higher than the official
actuarial rate. The city would calculate the "excess" inter-
est earned and reduce its contributions by that amount.
In 1975, the city subtracted the "excess" for two years in
advance from its contributions for one year. This practice
did not take into account actuarial losses. 25
But the Commission presented very limited explanation
of its own assumptions for calculating liabilities and levels
of fundedness. Abrupt reductions in levels of funding such
as the Commission found -- to one-fifth and one-quarter of
levels of only four years earlier -- would+sc*emingly require
greater explanation. Despite such deficiencies, the report
proved effective in creating doubts about what the real
status of the city's pension funds might be.
Political leaders, including Democrats, were already
having second thoughts about the wisdom of abolishing the
pension commission. The report provided the necessary ex-
cuse to delay action. Republican staff members of the
Assembly Ways and Means Committee said that closing down
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the Commission would be "a tragic mistake," and proposed to
restore its budget allocation. Key Democrats in the legis-
lature declined to continue to fight Republican efforts to
retain the Commission. An aide to Assembly Speaker Steingut
said that the latter was "in no mood to fight about the
pension commission, not after reading the report." Duryea
and Anderson meanwhile said they were attempting to get a
$370,000 appropriation for the Commission.26
By the end of March, compromise agreements between the
Republicans and Democrats supposedly settled the Pension
Commission issue. Leaders held a "summit" conference on a
number of items. The Pension Commission was reportedly the
"top item of Anderson's final list." In what the Times
referred to as a "classic case of political trading, bluffing,
compromise and facesaving," the leaders agreed that the
Commission would stay, but Kinzel would have to go. On its
editorial page, the Times also offered its explanation of
Carey's attempt to kill the Pension Commission, "at the
behest of the union leaders who contributed so lavishly to
his campaing fund." The present legislative compromise
resulted because "union leaders have demanded Mr. Kinzel's
scalp," in a "symbolic sacrifice" of the only well-known
commission member. The other aim was to "cow the rest of
the commission into the kind of sumissiveness the labor
chiefs prefer. " 27
The agreement did actually turn out to be "symbolic,"
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but not in the way the Times meant. Although Carey aides
sounded out members of the Pension Commission for the chair-
manship, the members unanimously said they wanted Kinzel to
remain in his post. Kinzel himself refused to resign,
despite pressure from the Governor's office. He said he
intended to serve out his term until its expiration in 1979,
in order to accomplish all the work that needed doing on pen-
sion reform.28
The Governor agreed in April to sign the budget bill
which included the Commission's appropriation. There was
some mention in the press of a new tactic, by which the
Governor would try to expand the Commission and appoint pro-
labor members. This did not happen either. Harold Conroy
was reappointed when his term expired in the summer of 1975,
and the Commission continued to have five members. 29
One explanation that the press offered for the legis-
lature's defense of the Kinzel Commission was that many
members -- including Democrats -- appreciated having a buffer
between themselves and the unions. But even more than this,
many Republicans in particular, under Senator Anderson's
leadership, now had a kind of proprietary attitude toward
the Commission. A few years earlier the newly established
Commission had yet to prove itself, and to convince anyone
of the 'importance of pensions. It was inexperienced; it
had not established ties with supporters in government and
elsewhere, and it issued controversial reports calling on
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legislators to do various unusual, unpopular things. Since
then, the Commission had written memoranda on the floods of
pension legislation (introduced despite the moratorium),
and had issued research reports and work summaries. The
Commission had established itself with the press and with a
number of lobbying groups, as an independent-minded group.
It had criticized actions of the Rockefeller administration
on.many occasions, and now tangled with Carey. Legislators
were uncertain how to deal with worsening fiscal problems
of local governments, including New York City, and the Com-
mission pointed out a connection between pension costs and
those problems. 3 0
Even public employees were disturbed by the Commission's
report on the NYC funds. An article in The Chief (a weekly
civil service publication) detailed the charge that the systems
were underfunded due in part to use of highly inaccurate
assumptions. Although the Commission "may well be overstating
the case" -- here the article cited Cavanaugh -- and trying
to defeat any bids for new benefits, "employees are beginning
to wonder if their pensions are in jeopardy." 3 1
In March, the Jump study from Syracuse University (see
page 4) added to the literature on New York City's pension
costs. Bernard Jump's findings, based on research done at
the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, in-
,cluded cost predictions through 1980 levels of funding; and
retirement costs as a percentage of payroll for each system.
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According to the report, NYC pensions cost $1.1 billion
in 1974 (including Social Security contributions). By 1980
they would cost at least $.4 billion, (down from $1.5 billion
in 1978), but probably closer to $2.1 billion. The minimum
cost projection was based on optimistic assumptions that
city employment would decline by 2% a year after 1975, and
that salaries in 1975 would increase by 5% and then remain
level. The more realistic assumptions were that employment
and salaries would increase at annual rates of 2% and 6%
after 1975; still below actual experience of the pant decade.
Under the latter assumptions, pensions would cost 23% to 35%
of payroll, exclusive of payments to federal Social Security.
Pensions now cost over 20% of payroll, Prof. Jump said, and
33% including Social Security.32
Prof. Jump also reported on the use of obsolete actu-
arial assumptions, which he said had been common knowledge
for over ten years. His findings were very similar to Kinzel
regarding outdated rates applying to deaths, turnover, sal-
aries and retirement, and on changes in the law which allowed
unsound fiscal practices.
Over the rest of the spring and summer, state and even
national press covered New York pensions. In the state
press, Charles Holcomb wrote a long piece for Empire State
Report in which he explained how New York pensions became
"underfunded" and "overcommitted." The article covered the
pension liberalizations of the 1960's, which were passed
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with the help and encouragement of Rockefeller and Levitt;
the effects of the 1967 Taylor Law in strengthening unions;
the D.C. 37 bill and the founding of the Kinzel Commission;
and the current attention given to the NYC pension funds.
Holcomb concluded that even if the next legislature were
to enact major rejforms, there would be little immediate
effect. Pension costs in the near future would continue to
increase. He also said that the state-administered funds
seemed safe, but no one knew what the status of the New
York City funds really was, or what would happen if'the city
could not pay its obligations. 3 3
In July the Times published the front-page article:
"How a $13,000 Bus Driver Won a Pension of $15,600." There
had been coverage before on pension abuses, although the
News tended to emphasize them much more than the Times,
but this time the Times made the most of its material. The
NYC actuary had done a study of city transit authority wor-
kers who retired in 1974. The article emphasized the finding
that 80 workers who retired that year worked enough overtime
to increase their final-year earnings by more than 40% over
their base pay (and most often, over 50%). Since pensions
for transit workers were based on final years' salary, the
authority had to increase its funding of those employees'
pensions by a total of $ million. Five workers earned over
$25,000 each in their final year, including overtime. One
of these earned over $30,000, hence the headline. However,
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you would have to read the article very carefully before you
managed to infer that of 757 transit employees retiring in
19 74, only 10% earned the gigantic overtime amounts that the
article emphasized -- 75 out of 179 surface (bus) workers,
and "only one percent" of 578 subway workers. The article
did say that large amounts of avertime were built-in to
the system, due to "long routes and operations involving
two widely separated peak periods," work rules which allow
senior men to pick runs, and very high absenteeism. Al-
though the overtime amounts for surface workers is quite high,
there was no comparison with levels of overtime among the bulk
of the workforce which was not retiring.34
In the national press, Pensions and Investments, the
trade magazine in the field, reported in April on the Kinzel
and Jump studies of New York City pensions. The editorial
deplored the "fiscal finagling" that drastically understated
costs and left the systems underfunded. The article assigned
the "ultimate responsbility" for this "breach of fiduciary
duty" to the board of trustees. It also advocated the exten-
sion of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
to state and municipal funds. 3 5
A finance column in U.S. News and World Report said
that pension obligations were "pushing many U.S. cities
uncomfortably close to financial chaos." It quoted NYC's
chief actuary saying that N.Y.'s pension funds could reach
"actuarial insolvency within ten years," and "actual insol-
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vency" ten or fifteen years later, without corrective action.
The article also looked at Los Angeles, where pension costs
were 50% of police and fire department payrolls; New Orleans,
which needed to double its annual contributions but couldn't
afford to; Washington, D.C., where pensions were growing 4%
faster than the city budget, and others.36
By the fall of 1975, New York City's financial crisis
had become one of the most important subjects in local pol-
itics. New York City's financial problems had reached a
turning point in the spring of 1975, when the banks refused
to underwrite any more city securities. Although a detailed
discussion of the causes and events of this crisis are well
beyond the scope of the paper, a brief summary is necessary,
to place the events of the coming year in perspective.
In June, 1975 the state legislature created the Munici-
pal Assistance Corporation (MAC), to issue securities on
the city's behalf, backed by the state's "moral obligation."
The city was in "virtual receivership." In-September 1975
the legislature created the Emergency Financial Control
Board (EFCB), a seven-member group dominated by state appointees,
with power over revenue estimates, and spending and borrowing
decisions of all city agencies. The legislators also passed
a financing package for the city consisting of the purchase
of MAC bonds by conventional investors, City and state pen-
sion funds, and the state itself. In November, the city
declared a moratorium on the payment of principal on $1.6
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billion in city notes maturing after December 10. The federal
government agreed to loan money on a short-term basis to
make up for temporary expenditure-revenue "imbalances."
The city was in a state of default -- different from bank-
ruptcy only by definition. The theme of fiscal
crisis became closely tied to pension reform in state poli-
tics. 37
Pension reform activities began in several spheres,
in anticipation of the 1976 legislative session. In the
Legislature, the Assembly Committee on Governmental Employees
held public hearings on several bills which would require
employees to contribute 80 of their salaries toward pensions.
In testimony opposing the bills, union representatives said
that public employees had already agreed to sacrifice wage
increases in view of the fiscal crises in state and local
government. To force further losses on workers would be
"totally insensitive" to the contributions already made.
They also argued that employee contributions result in pro-
portionately smaller savings to the employer, than the cost
assumed by the employee.38
Contributory pensions would affect all classes of em-
ployees. Among those testifying were Barry Feinstein for
the Conference of Public Employee Organizations, a CSEA rep-
resentative, and members of NYC and upstate police and fire-
men's organizations. Kinzel also spoke, saying that while
contributory pensions had some advantages, there were "alt-
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ernate ways" to change the system. The Pension Commission
was working at the time on a new proposal for introduction
to the Legislature, that would again incorporate Social
Security into pensions for maximum savings.39
In another development that would affect the legisla-
ture, Rochester's pensions again exceeded its Constitutional
tax limitation, by $30 million. The city planned to ask
the Legislature for a new local inoometax, or a "special"
state property tax in order to meet the obligation. The
alternative would be to cut services, in other words, fire
many workers. Senator Eckert's first response was that
city officials would have to back his pension reform propo-
sals before he would support any new taxes. Otherwise,
he said, it would be like giving "booze to alcoholics.".40
Local press coverage on pensions continued, including
editorial opinion in favor of reform. In contrast, a column
in a September issue of The Chief reported on the gloomy
outlook for public employees. "The era of public-employee
pension improvements is over," the article said, if the last
legislative session were any indication. Dozens of pension
bills had failed to make it out of committee or off the floor.
Carey vetoed those that did reach him. The moratorium also
carried over to labor legislation that did not concern pen-
sions, such as confidentiality of police personnel records,
police dispute arbitration, Taylor law strike penalties,
and an agency shop bill. The Legislature and Governor to-
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gether were upholding the moratorium and blocking union
gains.
The author also thought it likely that the Legislature
would extend the 1973 moratorium, due to New York's "fiscal
woes," and that the 1970 NYC-D.C. 37 agreement was unques-
tionably "doomed forever." Even with regard to collective
bargaining, "it would not be surprising if the moratorium
on negotiations were extended."42
A subsequent issue of the Chief reported an even more
alarming possibility: The loss of Increased-Take-Home-Pay
(ITHP). The Mayor had directed his Management Advisory
Board to conduct "an intensive review" of the city's pension
systems, with attention to potential underfunding. This,
the article said, "could mean that he is eyeing the ITHP
as a source of funds" for reducing the city's annual contri-
butions. Ending ITHP would be the same as a 4 or 5o pay
cut for employees. 4 3
The New York News had already suggested, in its "Save
the City" column, that the Mayor could eliminate ITHP. He
could theoretically do so at any time for most city employ-
ees, since it wasn't a contract provision. For uniformed
employees, the new contracts could end ITHP, especially since
the city supposedly did not have to collectively bargain on
.44pensions.
Private reform groups also anticipated the upcoming
legislative session. Citizens Public Expenditure Survey
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(CPES) opened its reform campaign in November with a mass
meeting in Albany. At the meeting, CPES and other groups
created the"CPES Taxpayer Action Council" to coordinate and
marshal support from taxpayer groups around the state. CPES
said that the council would "counteract the ridiculous de-
mands made on legislators by public employee unions and others
who suffer from the delusion that the public till is always
full." At least 20 groups had representatives at the meeting.
A number of legislators also attended, during breaks. from
the special session which was meeting at the time. .Kinzel
was the featured speaker. He explained the Pension Commis-
sion's reform strategies and praised CPES for its role in
saving the Commission. 4 5
Later on in the winter of 1975, information began trick-
ling in from the Pension Task Force of the Mayor's Manage-
ment Advisory Board. Actually, the Emergency Financial
Control Board had ordered the study in September, through
Mayor Beame. The Task Force members were an interesting
composite of corporate, union, and government interests.
There were four corporate officers and one actuary in the
group (from Metropolitan Life Insurance, Equitable Life,
General Motors, and Union Carbide); three union associates
(from Program Planners and the U.F.T.), two government act-
uaries (state and city) and a private actuarial consultant
who had worked both with unions and with the Pension Commis-
sion. By December, it was clear that the Task Force would
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not meet its December 31 deadline. The group had already
displeased the EFCB by not submitting interim reports, as
requested. Then the News wrote that it had learned that the
Task Force report would establish serious underfunding in the
city's retirement systems, using updated actuarial tables.
Richard Shinn, chairman of the Advisory Board, denied that
the Task Force had already reached this conclusion. The group
did not complete its report until March, one year after the
Pension Commission had released its controversial study.
(Findings will be discussed fully in the next chapter in
connection with legislative politics.)46
There was little prospect that pensions could be ig-
nored in 1976. The Pension Commission was "stronger than
ever." The Governor had failed to diminish its political
power, due to the Senate's firm position, outcry in the
press, lobbying by private groups, and Kinzel's well-timed
self-defense. The Commission had not modified its view of
the pension problem in any way, or of appropriate solutions.
The "fiscal climate" created by N.Y.C.'s default and its
$3 billion deficit meant a new political "climate," in Albany.
Although Republicans had held the most powerful positions
at the state level during the entire decade of the 1960's
when the problem supposedly began, the change was especially
striking for Democrats. Governor Carey now publicly advo-
cated continued fiscal restraint as "the public policy of
the state," where pensions were concerned. Although the
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Assembly's Democratic leadership showed no interest in pen-
sions at this time, the issue was by no means absent from
the Assembly, as the fall hearings demonstrated. As the
1976 session approached, with the ending of the pension mor-
atorium and the expiration of the "Tier 2" pension reforms,
it remained to be seen what the effect of three years of
pension politics would be: That is, whether any major reform
proposals would emerge as viable legislation; whether unions
would be able to limit any changes proposed; or whether the
Legislature would find some way to postpone definitive action.
4 7
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Chapter V
Over the winter, the Pension Commission completed a new
pension reform plan, which was intended to replace the reforms
enacted in 1973. These were due to expire June 30th. The
new proposal retained underlying features of the earlier
Kinzel plan. It was a uniform plan for all public employees
with 30 years of service, retiring at age 65, and entitled
to full replacement of take-home pay. It reduced the state
pension in proportion to Social Security payments. It also
kept policemen and firemen in a separate plan with no age
restriction, and a shorter minimum term of service than
other employees. 1
The new plan demonstrated the effect of the strong crit-
icism that the earlier proposal had received. The Social
Security offset in the new plan was 501, not 100o, of the
amount of the payment. The state pension would increase
up to 31o annually, depending on the employee's age at retire-
ment. Employees would contribute 31 of annual salary to the
pension system.
The proposal, called the Coordinated-Escalator Retire-
ment Plan (CO-ESC), (referring to integration and to the 3%
escalator) also called for the elimination of Increased-Take-
Home-Pay, and of payments to the special union annuity funds.
These were to save $170 million and $25 million annually,
respectively. The Commission said that the new plan would
be beneficial to long-service employees because benefits
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would surpass those payable under present systems at age
73, due to the escalator. 2
The public announcement of the new plan, on March 9,
was rather late, in comparison with previous years, and came
with as little advance notice. Kinzel spoke at a press con-
ference in Albany, at which he emphasized the costs of pensions
statewide. He said that expected savings from the plan would
total $2 billion in the next ten years, for all eight retire-
ment systems. 3
This time, the Commission took the initiative in hold-
ing hearings on its proposal in New York City, Albany, and
Rochester. Pension Commission members were surprised by
the criticism the proposal received from business and civic
groups, and local government officials, all of whom sup-
ported pension reform. The complaint was that CO-ESC was
still too generous, and still more liberal than private sec-
tor plans. At a New York City hearing, speakers included
City Council President Paul O'Dwyer (reportedly thinking of
running for the U.S. Senate), the mayors of Yonkers and
Larchmont, and several legislators. They generally praised
the Kinzel proposal, and the Commission, for having had the
courage to submit it despite the certain denunciation it
would receive from unions. 4
In Albany, the vice-president of Citizens Public Expen-
diture Survey called CO-ESC a "minimal step in the right
direction." A representative from General Electric called
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it a "faint signal of reform" to businesses that their taxes
would not increase much, due to pensions. In Rochester,
school board members and local government officials com-
plained variously that the proposed rate of employee contri-
bution was too low; that pensions accounted for about 20%
of property taxes, and that pensions cost too much generally.
They also approved of integration with Social Security. A
spokesman for an industry organization said that CO-ESC ben-
efits exceeded those of private employees in the Rochester
area. Commission members were particularly surprisod by
the lack of enthusiasm from CPES, one of its closet suppor-
ters.5
Labor groups in the state renewed their opposition to
pension reform, as embodied in CO-ESC. Before the hearings
began, Jack Bigel, the union pension consultant, denounced
CO-ESC as "totally regressive." He said that the 3% cost-
of-living escalator was a fraud. CO-ESC benefits would ex-
ceed those of current plans when retirees were about 75
years old, he said, but according to mortality tables "our
people start dying at age 73." The Pension Commission "will
reward you if you thwart their expectation of an early death,"
Bigel said. 6
At the start of the hearings in mid-March, Victor Gotbaum
announced that all New York City unions would boycott the
hearings. "We will not dignify hearings held by big-business
men with a contempt for working men," he said. The boycott
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included his own union District Council 37 of AFSCME, sani-
tation and transit workers' unions, and the police and fire-
fighter organizations. Gotbaum said that unions objected
to the Pension Commission's failure to consult them during
the development of the plan. Union leaders also wanted to
avoid being seen as losers by the rank-and-file. It seemed
to the leaders at this point that they would have nothing
to gain by going against the majority; that some changes
were inevitable due to the "fiscal climate." In addition,
they said, changes would only affect 10o of employees. In
any case, "a loser should never be visible." At the same
time, Kinzel commented that unions wererealizing that lesser
pensions were preferable to layoffs, so it was better to have
cash in hand to pay salaries. 7
Some public employee groups from outside New York City
did send representatives to the four hearings. Bernard Ryan
of the Civil Service Employees Association was the only
critic of the Kinzel proposal at the first hearing in New
York City. He told the Commission that CSEA members regarded
the proposal as a "serious threat" because it was an attempt
to take away collectively bargained benefits. He said that
CSEA had won non-contributory pensions, 1960-1965, in lieu
of pay increases.
In Albany, the New York State Retired Teachers, the New
York State Permanent Firemen's Association, and New York
State United Teachers sent representatives, all of whom
- 125 -
criticized CO-ESC. The Pension Commission "cares little about
the human dignity of working people," one said. A pension
consultant for the teachers' group said that CO-ESC hit them
particularly hard. Many teachers would have to work longer
than 30 years to reach age 65, and pay increased contribu-
tions for reduced benefits. 9  '
Another kind of testimony came from the Retired Public
Employees Association, representing a generation of public
employees whose working careers preceded the "Rockefeller
raises." These retirees had been in a fully contributory
system, and received a maximum of 355 of pay. They received
a cash supplement, renewed periodically by the legislature,
which they now asked be made a permanent benefit. Kinzel
responded that reform was the Commission's only target, and
that supplementation was a separate topic.10
The Mayor of Rochester, who had been having trouble pay-
ing the city's pension bills, criticized the proposal in a
way that madelit ambiguous as to whether or not he supported
reform. He questioned the estimated savings from the plan.
Recent cutbacks had left senior employees in most jobs; and
the 31 escalator could negate savings, he said. Also, the
3' salary contribution could be inadequate since so many
employees retired with only 20 or 25 years of service. 1
Kinzel commented that participation in the hearings
by some employee groups was a good sign, since it showed
their interest in the issue even though they criticized the
- 126 -
proposal. Public Employee Conference unions had boycotted
all four hearings, although they did send observers.12
Although unions did not immediately develop a strategy
to fight CO-ESC, they were not resigned to giving in. To
some extent, union officials felt that Assembly Democrats
would block any reform bills. They also thought that the
Pension Task Force Report (Shinn Report), soon to be released,
would vindicate their claims that the NYC pension systems
were adequately funded. This would reduce the urgency of
pension reform.
The unions also commissioned Jack Bigel to conduct an
analysis of the CO-ESC proposal. The report, dated March
22, was a key part of the labor strategy. It included various
issues relevant to the ongoing struggle over pensions, not
only the specific elements of Co-ESC but also sections on
wages and pensions in other cities and states, on U.S. Civil
Service pensions, and on private sector pensions. The re-
port claimed that the commission had failed to analyze the
cost implications of the 3%f escalator, and had not reported
on savings already accrued since 1973. The analysis also
asserted that the New York City pension systems were as well
funded as other large plans, in better shape than many cor-
porate ones, federal Civil Service, or Social Security.1 4
The three basic aspects of the proposal which Bigel
criticized were, as before, integration with Social Security,
the elimination of special temporary benefits, and stricter
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age and service requirements for unreduced benefits. Program
Planners again argued that integration was not a common
practice among pension plans, and becoming less so. The re-
port cited the Bureau of Labor statistics survey of 100 pen-
sion plans, in which 85 out of 90 plans (for which there
was complete data) did not integrate in 1974. 63 had never
done so, and 22 had stopped since 1958. A 1975 Bankers Trust
study of industrial retirement plans had concluded that the
trend among industry was to eliminate integration, or to
reduce the offset portion in order to effect cost-of.-living
increases. Program Planners did not, however, provide any
further explanation of why so many pension funds had aban-
doned the practice, and why it would be an undesirable prac-
tice for system administrators, as it evidently was.
Regarding the recommendation for ending ITHP and pay-
ments to union annuity funds, both affecting New York City
employees, Bigel argued that this resulted from the fallacious
assumption that private corporations seldom support more than
one source of retirement income. On the contrary, the report
claimed, corporations often support two or three programs,
including the pension fund, Social Security, and savings
or stock purchace plans. One such example was the Bankers
Trust Savings Incentive Plan, in which employees could set
aside up to 6" of pay in a fund that would collect 81/4%
interest annually.16
The Program Planners report also asserted that all em-
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ployee benefits were arrived at through collective bargaining,
pursuant to a benefit package. The benefit package consisted
of wages; fringe benefits such as sick leave and vacations;
working conditions, including seniority and overtime rules;
and pension programs. This view directly conflicted with
the Pension Commission ideology. The Commission had stated
in its original report in January 1972, that the sole purpose
of-pensions was to provide adequate income during retirement,
consistent with state fiscal capacity. Following from this,
questions of wages or working conditions were unrelated, and
should be dealt with separately. Pensions should not be used
to remedy problems in those areas. The Commission thus had
advocated a kind of ideal state of affairs which conflicted
with collective bargaining practice.
Bigel analyzed CO-ESC age and service requirements by
comparing CO-ESC and current benefits under several sets
of assumptions. At one extreme, assuming that employees
would work long enough to obtain the largest possible pension
(age 65 for some employees), Program Planners found initial
reductions from current levels ranging from 22% less for
policemen and firemen, to 47% for clerks; 34% less for tran-
sit workers, 37% for teachers, and 46% for sanitation workers.
At the other extreme, retirement at the earliest poss-
ible date (age 55 for most employees, 22 for police and fire),
initial reductions were 35% for policemen and firemen, 40%
for clerks, 46% for teachers, 51% for transit workers, and
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53% for sanitation workers. These reductions jumped to 60%,
63%, and 64%, respectively, for police, clerks and teachers
at age 62, due to the Social Security offset beginning at
that age.
The report also illustrated the effects of CO-ESC on
employees whose age and service characteristics at retire-
ment were in between the two extremes. Most employees would
be.in this category. This section showed benefits received
over time, including the effects of the 3% annual escalator.
For general employees retiring at ages 62-65, assuming 25
years of service and $15,000 final pay, CO-ESC benefits
would initially be at least $2500 less than current plans,
and approach the higher benefits at ages 80-88. For police-
men and firemen retiring at age 45 with 24 years of service,
the CO-ESC benefit would begin about $3000 lower; exceed
current levels at ages 55-62, decrease at age 62, and again
approach current benefits at age 65-70. CO-ESC would never
equal current benefits for police/fire with 23 years of ser-
vice; but with 25 years of service would exceed present ben-
efits by increasing amounts, after age 55.
Program Planners concluded from the data that CO-ESC
would entail reductions of 22% to 63% compared to current
pensions; with benefits contingent on increased service
amounts' of five, ten and twenty years; and therefore was
'absolutely contrary to the needs of employees." For all
employees, total lifetime benefits under CO-ESC would never
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exceed current amounts, except at ages 100-107.
Thus even for a "career employee" as defined by the
Pension Commission (age 65, 30 years of service), the CO-
ESC annual pensions would exceed existing ones only later
in the employee's retirement life, often at the cost of greatly
increased terms of service. The comparisons also emphasized
the vast difference between the Commission's conception of
adequate age and service requirements, and current practice.
While it may not sound unreasonable that policemen and firemen
should work until age 55, or for 25 years, these would mean
five to ten years more on the job. For example, a policeman
starting at age 25, to get the maximum benefit would have to
retire at age 55 after 30 years of service. This was 40-50/
greater than standard current practice.
In these comparisons, the report made no mention of the
Social Security portion of the employee's retirement income,
comparing only the state pension amounts. The Pension Com-
mission had in its calculations always totaled the two to
arrive at realistic income figures. The Program planners
report did not explain, or even refer to, the fact that they
had done this.
Two other controversial issues discussed were the ade-
quacy of funding of NYC plans, and projected savings from
pension reform. On the former topic, the Commission had been
misleading, the report said, and had barely addressed the
second.
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Kinzel's statement that the city systems were under-
funded by $6 billion was completely incorrect, the report
said. The $6 billion was an unfunded liability, to be amor-
tized over time, like a home mortgage. The report didn't
mention that one reason for the existence of a large unfunded
liability was the failure to make adequate payments on the
"mortgage," particularly when coupled with retroactive bene-
fits increases that escalate the amount to be funded. The
report did show various indicators of financial health.
These included cash flow sufficiency, and a 515 asset-lia-
bility ratio for all city systems.
The Pension Commission had projected $2 billion in
savings for 10 years, statewide. The report projected the
cumulative cost of government over that time to be $262
billion-$411 billion. At most, the pension savings would
reduce costs of government by about .75%, and by .5% under
the less conservative estimate. The report did not discuss
any changes in pensions as a percentage of payroll.
The report also discussed the fiscal crisis, a topic
that until now reformers had appropriated for their own
arguments. "NYC employees have literally saved the city from
the chaos of default," the report said, through "extraordinary
sacrifices." Employees had waived certain work rules* ($33
million value); and deferred a scheduled 6% wage increase
The report didn't mention that some of these were highly
controversial, such as reduced. summer hours.
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($180 million). 40,000 jobs were lost through attrition
($848 million). Employees had agreed to reduced take-home
pay ($106 million) as a concession to the federal government
in exchange for a loan program; and they had helped to get
a special revenue package for the city through the state
legislature ($330 million). Most important, public employees
had committed $2.5 billion from the pension funds to finance
city government,by buying MAC bonds, a most ironic situation.
In this section, the report also incorporated a compari-
son of wages in the 26 largest U.S. cities. The comparison
used both absolute amounts, and wages adjusted for the cost
of living in each city. Although average monthly pay of
non-teaching municipal employees in NYC was $1064 (as of
October, 1974),eighth out of 26, adjusted for the cost of
living the NYC average wage fell to sixteenth place.
The report attempted to counteract the popular conception
of city employees as the villains of the fiscal crisis, al-
though it didn't really debate the notion of city employees
as the cause of the crisis. It also addressed something that
had been at least tacitly a part of pensions reform ideology:
That NYC wages, as well as pensions, were far higher than
in other cities.
In April, new findings on New York City pensions had
a mixed impact, mostly negative, on the unions' anti-reform
effort. The Pension Task Force finally reported to the
Management Advisory Board and the EFCB. To some extent,
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the Shinn report vindicated unions claims on the adequacy
of funding in the city systems. It therefore contradicted
the Kinzel Commission's findings of severe problems. Funded
ratios for the five NYC systems were 40% (teachers), 41%
(police), 42% (fire), 45% (ERS), and 48% (Board of Education),
totaling 43%.15
The three union representatives on the Task Force dis-
agreed with the majority's formulation of assets (which exclu-
ded two year's appropriations due and unpaid). The report
therefore included a second set of funded ratios, ranging
from 49% (fire) to 60% (Board of Education), and averaging
53%. This was much closer to the figure reported by Program
Planners.
On the other hand, the Shinn Report reiterated in great
detail claims made in various other reports (Kinzel, 1975;
Jump, 1975) that the pension systems used assumptions which
differed greatly from actual experience. The Task Force
conducted its own valuation of the systems, modifying prac-
tically all the actuarial assumptions. Some of the changes
were substantial. There were recommended increases of 600%
and 2500% in the rates of accidental disablement in the
police and fire systems; and 150% and 110% higher ordinary
disability rates in those two systems. It recommended one-
third increase in-the service retirement rate for police,
and one-third less for firemen. The report also doubled the
service retirement rates for sanitation and transit clerks.
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A majority of the Task Force members agreed on pay in-
crease assumptions of 4-4i/ per year. This included average
promotion increases of 1-11% annually over an individual's
working career, plus a 3% general wage advancement for all
workers. Two labor representatives disagreed with this for-
mulation. They said that a 2-2 %% assumption was more accur-
ate, based on annual average general increase of only 1%.
Their reasoning was partly based on recent events, including
Carey's wage freeze for state workers, and increased attri-
tion, which they said would reduce the number of promotional
increases.
The Task Force valuation did not use new mortality
tables, although the report said that there was as much as
a 10% variation from recent experience. The study also used
a 51% interest rate, up from 4%, which unions had advocated
at least as far back as 1973, at the Select Committee hearings
on the first Kinzel proposal. The task force also used,
and recommended, an alternate funding method (i.e. method
of calculating the amounts due over the pay-back period).
The Shinn report was much less dramatic and accusatory
than the 1975 Pension Commission report on the NYC systems.
It explained much more carefully how current experience dif-
fered from assumptions in use, and which assumptions needed
changing. The impression it gave was that there was less
finagling with figures than previous studies had implied.
But the report's final recommendations were not that
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dissimilar from prior findings. Although the systems were
not now underfunded, the city should increase its contri-
butions by $208 million annually to avoid future underfunding,
the Task Force concluded. Most of the increase was to come
from member contributions. That is, employees would no longer
receive benefits such as automatic heart disability payments,
or Increased-Take-Home-Pay. Workers hired after 1973 would
receive pensions based on a three-year final-average salary,
offset by half of the amount received from Social Security.
The Shinn Report, while it was reassuring on the subject
of the funding status of the city systems, and presented
more complete data on plan valuation (rather than vague
warnings), also recommended changes that were at least as
severe as those supported by the Pension Commission and other
reformers.
Recognizing this, a union representative on the Task
Force, Anthony Gajda (vice-president of Program Planners),
partially repudiated its findings. He said that the recom-
mendation to completely end ITHP was contrary to the agree-
ment reached the previous November among unions, Governor
Carey, the Municipal Assistance Corporation, and the city.
Unions had agreed to a 50% cut in ITHP, as of April 1, 1976
(to a maximum of 21% of pay), with the understanding that
the other half would remain. Gajda also repeated the asser-
tion that a 21% wage increase assumption was more realistic.
This made a critical difference. Under this assumption,
no additional contributions were necessary, he said.16
Despite this and other disagreements, the report had
succeeded in obtaining a measure of consensus between unions
and reformers on some aspects of pensions. This was a prob-
lem for the unions. They could no longer unilaterally dis-
credit all reform by claiming that it was the product of
"big-business" men, designed solely to rob the workingman
of his rightful benefits. There was an increased element
of non-partison "public interest" in pension reform.
In the meantime, the CO-ESC proposal was not progressing
in the Legislature. At the outset, Warren Anderson had said
that the M'arch 9 Kinzel report was an "outstanding public
service," and CO-ESC deserving of "serious and sympathetic
consideration." In the Assembly, Stanley Steingut had only
said that he needed more time to study the proposal before
commenting, as did Governor Carey. Carey also commented that
it would be difficult to mandate a contributory plan when
at the same time he was refusing pay increases to state
workers.17
In reality, both Republican and Democrat leaders had
reacted in a similar way. In the words of an Assembly staff
person assigned to work on the proposal, it was a "technical
and administrative boondoggle." An Anderson aide saw it as
a proposal that was desirable in theory but a "turkey" in
practice.18
Staff analysts found a number of problems in the pro-
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posal. First, it was complicated to understand. The Social
Security offset in particular would be difficult to admin-
ister. This allegedly could not be reduced to a uniformly
applicable formula, but would require individual actuarial
computation in each case. The same problem applied to the
3% escalator: "No one really knows how it works." The
excalator would also be very expensive to provide for police
and firemen, after 22 years of service regardless of age.
The proposal did provide that the new plan should not apply
if it'were more expensive than existing ones. In this case,
CO-ESC could conceivably never cover police and fire pensions.
Legislative analysts also found that the CO-ESC formu-
lation of disability retirement would in effect prevent
anyone from qualifying for those benefits. Partially dis-
abled employees would stay on the job instead of retiring.
Management would have no way to get rid of these employees
other than disciplinary action, which is damaging for labor
relations, and undertaken very reluctantly.20
In addition to the official, technical reasons for
delaying CO-ESC, unions were depending on Steingut to prevent
the proposal from getting anywhere in the Assembly.2 1
Once again, Senator Eckert was the strongest legislative
supporter of pension reform. He and Assemblyman Hanna had
sponsored reform bills in February, before the release of
CO-ESC. .In April Eckert introduced a bill to enact CO-ESC,
modifying the 1973 legislation (Article 11 of the Retirement
and Social Security Law). There was also an assembly version,
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with Rules committee sponsorship. Eckert's bill was referred
to the Senate Civil Service Committee and stayed there.
The second week of May, a legislative columnist for the
Albany Times-Union wrote, "it now appears certain that such
reforms are dead in this election year." The 1976 legislature
would probably extend current benefits another year, since
legislators would otherwise face union displeasure at the
polls, the writer predicted. The press accused Senator
Schermerhorn, Civil Service committee chairman, of bowing
to the pressure of legislative leaders, and behind them
union lobbyists, to keep Eckert's bill in committee. In
response, Schermerhorn said that he was preparing his own
version of a pension reform bill. It would create a sep-
arate plan for police, fire, and corrections employees.
He would "let both bills out when the time comes," the Senator
said. Schermerhorn's announcement of a bill came as a sur-
prise, but it didn't lead to any more action on pensions.
Pension Commission reforms were again at a standstill.22
One reason for this may have been that another contro-
versial pension issue was already claiming the legislature's
attention. Evidently alarmed by the recent reports recom-
mending an end to the "heart bill" for policemen and firemen,
Senator John Marchi (Republican-Conservative, Staten Island)'
was pushing a bill which would make these benefits permanent.
The heart bill had a controversial past. It provided that
a policeman or fireman with heart disease could qualify for
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retirement on three-quarters pay, on the presumption that
the disease was work-related. According to the Daily News,
Rockefeller, Harriman* and Dewey* had vetoed similar legis-
lation 13 times altogether. N.Y.C. Mayors Lindsay, Wagner
and Beame had opposed it. Finally in 1969 a "temporary"
provision became law, covering police and fire officers out-
side of New York City. In 1970, amid heavy lobbying by the
PBA, the UFA and the Police Conference of New York State,
the legislature passed a bill covering New York City, which
Rockefeller signed. The New York City Council had refused
to pass a home-rule message**, so the bill was writ'ten to
change the General Municipal Law rather than the INYC Admin-
istrative Code. The Legislature had renewed the "temporary"
provisions annually. The 1973 extension had been for three
years, matching the period of the moratorium on collective
bargaining for pensions. 2 3
Police and fire unions were out in force to lobby for
Marchi's bill. The Senate passed it by a large majority
in April, amid publicity and protest. A New York City police
surgeon said that the bill's intentions were fraudulent.
Policemen should have healthier hearts than most people,
due to physical exertion on the job, he said. Further, high-
ranking police officials received disability pensions, but
NYS Governors. Dewey 1942-44, 1946- ; Harriman 1955-58.
Required by law for amendments to NYC Administrative Code.
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ordinary officers didn't. The Times said that there was a
"virtual epidemic of service-connected heart disease" after
the New York City heart bill was enacted.2 4
Two weeks later, the Assembly passed the beart bill,
again by a wide margin, despite "strong objections" from
layor Beame, members of the Shinn Task Force, and the Pension
Commission. The EFCB, and the State Civil Service and In-
surance Departments notified the governor of their opposition.
Beame urged Governor Carey to veto the bill. He said it
violated the concept of home rule, and would encourage unions
to seek "special" legislation for any benefits they hadn't
won at the bargaining table. 2 5
United Firefighters President Edwin Jennings defended
the bill in a special column in the Daily News. He cited
various statistics demonstrating the dangers employees faced:
Death rate in the line-of-duty was seven times greater among
firefighters than in any other city occupation; injuries
tripled 1970-1975, after budget cuts reduced the number of
men responding to calls; one-quarter of all heart attacks
among firemen occured at the scene of a fire. 35 states
have heart legislatior to protect disabled workers, Jennings
said. 26
Governor Carey vetoed the bill late in May. He did
not refer to any of the argumentsjagainst it, but said only
that he would deal with "broad reform" of pensions, not
piecemeal changes 27
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By the middle of May, the press was becoming restive
over the Legislature's inaction on the Pension Commission
proposal. Senator Schermerhorn allegedly had planned to
bring a pension reform bill before the Republican Senate
Civil Service Caucus, but Anderson had prevented him from
doing so. One reason given was that the Republicans wanted
to delay until Beame made a final decision on NYC's partici-
pation in Social Security, dispite the fact that the Mayor
had two years. toidecide. In March, Mayor Beame had notified
the federal government that the City of New York would with-
draw from Social Security. This began a two-year notice
period, before the city could actually withdraw. The Mayor
said this move would cut the city budget by $200 million
annually, not including increased costs to replace lost bene-
fits. 2 8
The Daily News issued one of its pithy editorials,
entitled "Mice, Men -- and Legislators." Legislative leaders
were determinedly avoiding pensions "like children afraid
of the dark," the News said, "hoping that a big bad bugaboo
will go away." Anderson and Steingut "have cravenly folded
under" the "enormous union pressure" against reform. In
slightly more dignified language, the Times prevailed on the
Governor and Legislative leaders to stop evading the issue,
and to "act quickly," before pension obligations of "hundreds
of millions of dollars" drove cities into bankruptcy. 2 9
In the beginning of June, yet another report precipi-
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tated a small tempest. In the summer of 1975, Mayor Beame
had established a Temporary Commission on City Finances,
to recommend ways the city could save money. Former State
Supreme Court Justice Owen McGivern headed the Commission.
Raymond Horton (author of the 1973 Citizens Union study)
was staff director. The Commission's research focused on
fringe benefits for city employees. In the report released
in early June, the Commission said that fringe and leave
benefits cost two-thirds of average base pay, or $10,616
worth of benefits on the average, compared to $16,091 average
pay. Therefore the total average cost per employee was
$26,707.30
A few of the study's recommendations were about pensions.
The Commission reiterated earlier arguments that the Legis-
lature should not extend ITHP or the heart bill, and that
the city should not include union annuity contributions in
its new contracts.
Although most of the recommendations related to benefits
other than pensions, the report added to the conflict be-
tween labor and reformers. It also came at an awkward time
for the city administration. Contract negotiations for most
city workers were imminent. Although the Times commented
that the report gave the city needed ammunition for austerity
in the new contracts, it clearly embarrassed city officials. 31
It also angered unions. Victor Gotbaum denounced the
report and said that Horton was "an inveterate liar" and
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"anti-labor." Gotbaum was at the time involved in an exchange
with members of Congress over compensation levels of NYC
workers. Senator Proxmire (chairman of Senate Ways and
Means) had issued a report which said that NYC workers had
the best pay and benefits of any city employees. Gotbaum
had released figures of D.C. 37 workers which contradicted
the Senator's report. Members of the city's congressional
delegation had in turn accused Gotbauim of using misleading
figures.32 .
Almost two weeks after the McGivern Commission report,
D.C. 37 issued a rebuttal, claiming that the Commission had
"misrepresented" costs. In one example, the report had used
maximum salary, rather than the average, to calculate pension
costs. In another, the report had overestimated Social
Security costs by using a percentage of the (Social Security)
maximum base pay. The maximum base was much higher than
the average pay of D.C. 37 members, the union said. 3 3
While in New York City attention focussed on the inter-
change over municipal workers wages and benefits, Senator
Eckert had introduced the CO-ESC proposal on June 10, with
18 multi-sponsors*. It was modified to allow "Tier 2"
benefits to remain. He said at the time that it would pass
on the floor, but Anderson would not let it out of committee
Bills introduced by individuals have a prime sponsor; may
have co-s ponsors (listed with the prime sponsor); and multi-
sponsors (listed in alphabetical order following the prime
sponsor).
for a vote. He also said that most legislators were "just
looking for a way out" with regard to pension reform. The
danger now for pension reformers was that the leaders and
Carey, would stall until just before the June 30 deadline,
when they would extend the "Tier 2" plan for another year.
By next year, pension reform could conceivably be a less
popular issue.34
In mid-June, the legislature recessed for a week to
allow NYC legislators to work on their primary petitions
for the coming election. Senator Eckert, with the encour-
agement and financial backing of Rochester-area businessmen,
decided to use that week to campaign as well, not for election,
but for pension reform. He would spend several days in the
New York City area, where reform was more controversial,
and the rest of the time upstate. If he could publicize
the issue enough, and particularly, convince editorial writers
to support him in a concentrated campaign, legislative leaders
would have to respond to the "crisis" thereby created.35
On Tuesday, June 15, Eckert publicly opened his cam-
paign with a press conference in New York City. He told
the conference that Carey, Anderson and Steingit were plan-
ning to postpone pension reform because they didn't want
opposition from civil service unions in an election year.
"(I)f we had adoped the reforms five years ago we wouldn't
be laying off police and firemen across the state," he said.
With Eckert at the press conference were William Thomas,
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who headed the Shinn pension study; Owen McGivern; and Otto
Kinzel, who also spoke. Eckert had met with members of the
Pension Commission the day before, for a briefing on techni-
cal aspects of CO-ESC.3 6
Tuesday morning, Eckert and his assistant, Richard
Stowe, a law student, presented their case before the
Daily News editorial board. Eckert argued that a massive
push of public opinion could get the legislature to do the
"right thing," since they had to act anyway. The board was
skeptical. Previous editorials had had no effect. Eckert
said that this time, editorial backing would give him the
ability to force a Senate vote. Once the Senate passed the
bill (which he regarded as a foregone conclusion), the
Assembly would have to follow suit. Republicans and upstate
Democrats would almost certainly have no choice about voting
for reform.3?
Echert and Stowe continued to Newsday (a daily paper
orierted toward the suburban Long Island counties of Nassau
and Suffolk). They found the board receptive to their presen-
tation. The editorial page editor asked Ackert to write a
full page article on pension reform.38
On Wednesday morning, the News had a lead editorial
blasting the "reluctant, union-cowed State Legislature"
for "hiding, ducking for cover,.., and desperately manufac-
turing excuses to avoid resolving an issue that should have
been settled three years ago." That day Eckert saw the edit-
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orial writers for the Wall Street Journal, and Times staff.
Editorial staff for the left-oriented New York Post, a paper
which had barely covered pensions at all, told Eckert that
he would have to check first with their publisher, before
they would see him. Evidently realizing that they were not
likely to be on his side, Eckert did not pursue the issue. 3 9
On Thursday and Friday, Eckert was in Rockland County*,
Syracuse and Buffalo holding press conferences,with radio
and television coverage in each place. Friday night, he was
back in Rochester, the campaign over. A barrage of edit-
orials and feature articles appeared, around the state.
Newsday ran Eckert's article in the Sunday edition. Other
papers had requested and printed Eckert's article. The
Wall Street Journal wrote that the legislature had "one last
chance" "to tackle the pension problem." The Journal ex-
plained it as a wider political issue: ,"Elected officials
did with pensions what they were simultaneously doing with
the public debt," during the 1960's. Mail and calls flowed
into the Legislature, and on Monday, leaders met to decide
what to do.4o
The Republican caucus agreed to discuss Eckert's bill.
Anderson said that the Senate would probably pass it, and
that the Assembly would amend it to extend "temporary" bene-
fits. The next day, Eckert's June 10th reform bill passed
Suburban outpost of NYC metropolitan region.
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the Senate, 42-13. The bill established a third "tier" of
pension benefits.4
Democrats attacked the bill as an "election-year fake."
Manfred Ohrenstien, Senate Minority Leader (Brooklyn), said
that the new plan would "create havoc" and provide minimal
savings. Albert Blumenthal, Assembly M,,Iajority Leader, said
that the plan would actually increase costs due to the cost-
of-living escalator.4 2
But Republicans were saying that they had gained a
political edge over Democrats by taking the initiative.
If the Assembly refused to act now, upstate Republi'can
contenders could use this as an issue in the coming elections,
against their Democratic counterparts. 43
Assembly Democrats were in an "unwelcode public spot-
light." The Democratic conference met to devise a strategy.
One of Steingut's top aides told members that CO-ESC was
a "sham" which wouldn't save any money, but that the Assembly
had to respond to the public "clamor." When Eckert's bill
had passed the Senate, the Senator still used Kinzel's figure
of $2 billion in savings. Subsequently, Dr. Metz, executive
director of the Pension Commission, had said that $1.6 billion
was a better estimate, due to the changes in the bill, par-
ticularly, retention of "Tier 2" benefits. Steingut's staff
said that even that figure depended on the elimination of
ITHP and of union annuity fund payments. Democrats complained
that Governor Carey had not participated at all in political
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strategy. He had not come up with a proposal of his own
or found a face-saving way out of the current situation. 4 4
Donald Wollett, head of the state Office of Employee
Relations, then reported to Carey, recommending a weaker
version of CO-ESC. It did not include a salary contribution.
It continued 20-year half-pay pensions for police and fire-
men. On the 26th, Carey finally offered a bill to the leg-
islature. It resembled the Senate version, except at Stein-
gut's instigation it provided for a new 14-member state pen-
sion commission. Members would be one salaried chairman,
four public employee representatives, four representing the
"public interest " and four from public employers. Repub-
licans received copies of the bill that afternoon, and appeared
to accept most of it. At 3 A.M. the following morning, the
Governor's bill passed the Assembly, 120-29, in an "unruly"
session in which pro-reform legislators fought the amend-
ment to change the Pension Commission and oust Kinzel. 4 5
Another difference in the Assembly bill was that it
did not allow police and firemen to receive the 3o annual
increase until age 62. The Senate bill had allowed the
escalator after 22 years of service. The purpose of the
change, the News reported, was to punish police and fire
unions for their consistent support for Republican and Con-
servative Party candidates, including their backing of Lt.
Gov. Wilson against Carey. This contrasted with the tech-
nical explanation given by Assembly staff, that the escalator
would be very expensive st'arting at very early ages. 4 6
Eckert praised the Assembly bill, except for the amend-
ment to reconstitute and expand the Pension Commission, and
said he would put it through the Senate. Senator leadership
told Eckert they would not agree to the reduction in benefits
for police and firemen. Members were by now impatient for
the unusually long session to end. Each side accused the
other of sabotage. Democrats thought the Senate was trying
to evade action but put the blame on them; the Senate looked
suspiciously on the Assembly's modifications of the bill.
Pension reform publicity had made members in both larties
extremely nervous. The Legislature was also divided over
whether to recess or to adjourn for good. 4 7
Late the next night, Anderson and Steingut reached ten-
tative agreement. Steingut conceded on both points. The
present Commission would stay, and policemen and firemen
could receive the escalation upon retirement. In return,
Anderson would allow passage of some stalled Senate bills,
each of which was "extremely important to a freshman Demo-
cratic assemblyman." This would anger the Senate rank-and-
file, because it would help marginal Democrats in the elections.
Anderson's counsel also suggested the appointment of special
observers to the Pension Commission, to represent public
employdes. They would be entitled to attend Commission
,meetings but not to vote. The press reported that this was
designed to pacify union leaders Gotbaum and Albert Shanker. 4 8
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On June 28, three Democratic assemblymen introduced a
bill with the agreed-on provisions. Stephen Greco, chairman
of the Governmental Employees committee was prime sponsor.
A powerful Rochester Democrat, Thomas Frey, was one of the
co-sponsors. 27 other assemblymen multi-sponsored the bill,
including 18 Democrats, 15* from upstate (including large
Rochester and Buffalo contingents), and 3 from New York City.
Eckert introduced the Senate version of the same bill, with
19 co-sponsors. Another bill, under Rules Committee spon-
sorship, made some technical corrections of the main bill.
Both bills passed June 29th. The legislature recessed at
7 A.M. on June 30, after what the Daily News called "one of
the longest most chaotic sessions ever."
Although CO-ESC had undergone some transformations and
rewriting, the basic provisions remained substantially un-
changed. These included integration with Social Security;
3% salary contributions; a cost-of-living escalator of up
to 3f; and actuarial reductions for retirement at less than
specified service amounts and/or ages. It was a uniform
plan for all public employees in the state. According to
the fiscal note accompanying the new law, CO-ESC would save
New York retirement systems $1.4761 billion over the next
ten years. 5 0
Among reformers there were doubts about various pro-
visions of CO-ESC. Senator Eckert had not wanted to keep
police and firemen in a separate plan allowing earlier retire-
The Legislative Index lists a Vianhatten Dem.-Lib. whose name
is very similar to a Buffalo Dem., probably an error.
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ment. A number of reformers, including Eckert, had thought
the contributory factor unnecessary, or even detrimental.
It could lead to pressure for wage increases to make up
for lost income. Legislative aides, and administration
officials thought the bill was too complicated, and admin-
istratively unworkable. Governor Carey had agreed to the
bill with the understanding that the technical problems would
be ironed out. The bill would not be immediately appli-
cable, so there were as much as five years to make needed
changes. The Governor, in his statement approving the bill
on July 27, said that he would convene a task force composed
of administration and pension system officials, to study
the "administrative implications of these bills" and recom-
mend remedial legislation. 5 1
The New York City actuary, Jonathan Schwartz, called
the new law an "absolute monstrosity." He said it would
reduce attrition and increase the city's expense budget.
This.would upset the city's EFCB-mandated austerity plan.
The effect of a reduction in the cost of pensions as a per-
centage of payroll would be minimal since the city could not
afford to hire many new workers. Schwartz also warned that
it would be difficult and expensive to administer the Social
Security offset. For this reason private industry had al-
ready turned to simpler methods for effecting pension savings,
he said. 52
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One of the more remarkable things about CO-ESC was
the apparent abrupt turn-around of the bill at the end of
session. It may have been the case that members slowly
became interested inthe bill, as one Senate aide suggested,
and it was also true that Eckert had found 18 multi-sponsors
for a modified version of the Pension Commission proposal,
by June 10. But in the Assembly there is no evidence of
support for the bill before Eckert's trip. Assembly leaders,
and Governor.Carey, then agreed to compromise with Senate
Republicans. The Assembly strategy at the end of June was
to put upstate Democrats on the bill. Two influential up-
state Democrats introduced the bill. The majority leader,
Blumenthal, was on the bill, as was a Democratic assemblywoman
from Staten Island (a politically conservative area of New
York City). 5 3
The situation to some extent resembled descriptions
of two aspects of legislative activity. One observer wrote
in 1948 (on the New York legislature) that "the Legislature
is naturally as dilatory as most lawmaking groups and stalls
during the early part of the session, then embarks on a mad
rush before adjournment." A more recent work analyzed the
legislature's handling of very controversial issues.
"The governor and the leaders are often confronted
with popular demands for reform legislation,
hotly pursued by large sectors of the public, and
opposed with equal heat by other sectors of the
population. It is very often in the political
interest of the governor and the leaders to evade
involvement in such controversies altogether, or
at least to delay involvement in them as long as
possible. Such tactics, however, do not always
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make the problems disappear. On the contrary,
the longer the delay, the stronger the clamor
tends to grow, the more interest groups line up
for and against the'proposal, and an atmosphere
develops in which some legislator or group of
legislators, or the minority party itself, finds
the situation ripe for the introduction of some
legislative solution of the contested issue, and
the governor and the legislature are forced to
deal with the problem.
The leaders are still in a position to exert
strong influence over the outcome, but their in-
fluence is no longer totally decisive, since in
these cases many legislators feel free to choose
between party loyalty and the demands of their
own constituencies, and even to follow their own
personal ideological or sometimes religious pref-
erences."-
If the leaders in both houses had intended to stall until
the last possible moment, and then rush through an extension
of Article 11 (Tier 2 benefits), then they had certainly
lost control over the situation by the end of June. The
fact that each party controlled one house further complicated
the situation., Neither one wanted to be in a position where
the other held a political edge, particularly in an election
year. Caution and evasion may have been intended to let
the other party step -- or misstep -- first. 5 4
The other notable aspect of the passage of CO-ESC was
the unions' almost total failure to prevent action on the bill
and to keep from losing ground. Unions had been taken by
surprise when a pension reform bill was first reported from
committee. Gotbaum, one of the prime movers this year, did
not begin lobbying until May, relatively late in the session.
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In June, when the Speaker put upstate Democrats on a pension
reform bill, the unions felt betrayed. After a floor vote
on one of the Assembly bills, one union lobbyist furiously
confronted Steingut and accused him of going back on his
word. Steingut was by this time impervious to the unions'
claims.53
Unions had also split up into the usual groups. Police
and fire unions had pressed very strongly one issue that
benefitted theirmembers alone, the heart bill. State teachers
won a number of allegedly expensive changes in pension laws.
Legislators had also made a last attempt to preserve special
benefits, by -temporarily reopening the generous Legislative
and Executive Pension Plan. After session ended in June,
The Chief reported on the "pension disaster" that had taken
place: "The legislature and Governor Carey have perpetrated
the most grievous wrong on public employees in the history
of civil service in this state."56
The Pension Commission at this time experienced a vin-
dication of its efforts over the years. The press had again
been a crucial ally. State and city fiscal problems had
dramatized the flaws of deficit finance. The Governor and
Legislature had presumably recognized the worth of the Com-
mission's central recommendations. A New York City study
group With union representation had confirmed Pension Com-
,mission recommendations through an independent analysis
(Shinn Report). Otto Kinzel, the independent-minded chairman
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who had at times offended unions and Administration alike,
remained in his post. (He was not replaced until late 1978.)
Although reformers from the business sector and from local
governments outside New York City had complained that CO-ESC
was still too expensive, the Pension Commission had showed
that it could make use of strategy designed to lessen the
opposition to reform, if not so much by unions, then by leg-
is.lators and the Governor's office. And most important,
the strong support by one legislator, and the tremendous
publicity, had made the legislative leaders and Governor real-
ize that it could be to their advantage to enact pension
reform.
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Conclusion
In the early 1970's, groups in business and industry
and a few government officials, became concerned about the
huge costs of New York public employee pensions. During
the previous decade, these groups had watched the expansion
of government employment and services, and the concurrent
growth of pension obligations, with increasing alarm. Group
after group issued its study of pensions -- NYC Chamber of
Commerce, NYC Economic Development Council, City Club, Citi-
znes Union, and a number of ad-hoc government study commis-
sions. They found unfunded liabilities of billions of dollars,
pensions costing 20-3O& of payroll, 216 laws passed in the
state legislature which increased benefits on a piecemeal
basis, noncontributory pensions, and annuities for some
employee groups paid for only by government contributions.
Matters came to a head in the late spring of 1971, amid
a dispute over new pension benefits between a suddenly fis-
cally conservative state legislature, and a large, militant
NYC union representing the "underdogs" of public workers:
Non-teaching, non-uniformed employees. A new state commis-
sion was set up, called the permanent commission on public
employee pension and retirement systems, to make it clear
that from now on there would be an official watchdog over
local governments, to check their inclinations to grant
new benefits. The new commission first defined its goals
to be the achievement of uniform, adequate, non-excessive
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pensions. Uniform pensions would bring all public employees
down to a common level, eliminating unions' constant attempts
to exceed each others' benefits. Adequate, non-excessive
pensions would provide replacement of after-tax income to
employees who spent a working lifetime in government -- and
reduce pensions for employees who retired still young enough
to earn a living elsewhere.
One of the interesting things about pension reform was
that it never seemed to succeed very well, at first. On
two separate occasions, in 1973 and 1976, the Pension Com-
mission submitted major reform proposals to .the state legis-
lature, and both times met with rebuffs -- subtle and not-
so-sublte ones -- from the Governor's office, from legisla-
tive leaders, and certainly from unions. The law which finally
passed in 1973 -- after considerable evasion of the issue --
fell far short of the Commission's plan for comprehensive,
lasting change.
New York was not at all unique, either in the percep-
tion of problems of great magnitude, or the inexplicable
failure to do anything about them. In a very few places,
pension reform happened as thoroughly or drastically as,
for example, &\ Oc-\0iW CAl- , where voters approved a
referendum -to reduce pensions for current workers in 1976.
But in 1976, after endless stalling and uncertainty,
New York finally got a strong pension reform law, which
contained substantially the same provisions the Pension
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Commission had recommended earlier that year. The new reform
law followed the same underlying principles embodied in the
Commission's tougher 1973 proposal, but its projected savings
were 25% less, due to changes in application.
This thesis has attempted to discover the nature of the
forces for and against pension reform in New York; why -- or
whether -- pension reform eventually succeeded; and what
implications there are for public policy. The major subjects
included in this analysis were the pension commission, organ-
ized labor, the state legislature, and the press. Other
topics were the NYC fiscal crisis, the private reform groups,
and conflicts over data.
The Pension Commission was set up as an official forum
for the reform ideology of the private sector. One element
of this ideology was that the pension problem was a problem
of cost. The major culprits were public employee unions,
particularly the large, militant YC ones. The solution
was to counterbalance the unions' influence, by providing
permanent "taxpayer" representation before city government
and the state legislature where there had been none before.
The new commission excluded even nominal representation of
union interests. To ensure "taxpayer" representation, three
commission appointees were businessmen, in addition to two
former 'government officials. The commission's two "senior
,advisors" from the administration, Levitt and Wilson, were
also instrumental in setting up and guiding the commission,
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especially Lieutenant Governor Wilson. Despite the importance
both these officials had had in helping public employees
obtain new benefits during the '60's, -- even in 1969, dis-
claiming any drastic need for reform (in the Moore report) --
by 1971 both were strongly pre-reform.
The rational ideal of pension reform excluded ideas
not connected to reducing pension costs. This meant, for
example, fundamental conflict between the reformers' position
that pensions exist solely to provide retirement income;
and the labor position that pensions are deferred compensa-
tion, and as such are considered together with wages, fringe
benefits, and working conditions. It also led to a certain
blindness, as when Kinzel attributed to labor leaders a
concern about layoffs, in the beginning of the fight over
CO-ESC. Union leaders had mentioned nothing of the kind,
but rather were concerned with maintaining a politically
advantageous position. The Commission also did not consider
the inadequacy of pensions for some employees. There was
no initial follow-up, for example, of the Moore committee
recommendation that pensions should protect retirees from
inflation, or any reference to the problems of retirees who
preceded the "Rockefeller increases" of the 1960's.
The Commission's method of operation preserved its
special view of the world and gave the Commission an even
stronger elitist character. The Commission used private
consultants to develop proposals in the primary stages,
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then conducted an internal review. Legislative members and
staff, and unions were aggrieved at this secretive procedure.
Legislators resented proposals which were sprung on them and
which they were then expected to support. They also found
numerous "technical" problems, particularly with CO-ESC,
and strongly doubted whether this program could ever be put
into practice.
In this way the Commission prevented its strict views
from being watered down by ideological compromise, and also
alienated various sectors of the political world.
On the other hand the Commission was able to cultivate
considerable support for its reform program from the state
press and from private interest groups. These became signi-
ficant forces in their own right.
In NYC, the Times and News were strongly pre-reform.
Thomas Poster of the News was the single most prolific pension
reporter in the state. Several newspapers in Rochester and
Albany, and Charles Holcomb of the Gannett chain provided
fairly constant reportage of pensions. The considerable
power of the press was demonstrated in particular on two
occasions. One was in 1975 when editorials and articles
attacked Carey's attempt to abolish the Pension Commission;
the other was in 1976 when newspapers stepped in at a crucial
moment to force legislative leaders into action.
Private-industry-related and civic groups provided
citizen support for the Commission's reforms. CPES, itself
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a coalition of smaller groups, lobbied heavily both for the
Commission's continued existence in 1975, and to keep CO-ESC
alive in 1976. Although in 1976 many groups were displeased
with CO-ESC because of the very provisions that made it more
palatable to legislators, the Commission was the strongest
official forum for pension reform and continued to receive
support for its work.
If the Pension Commission is the major protagonist
in the process of pension reform, then organized labor is the
antagonist. Public employee unions presumably exist to ach-
ieve better living standards for their members. The major
means for doing this is the attainment of political power,
which has several elements: The respects that rank-and-file
members have for union leadership; the union's position of
authority relative to other unions; and the right to collect-
ively bargain the terms of employment.
Although employee organizations had bargained with
government before the advent of official sanctions, unions
in New York reacted angrily to the idea that pensions were
unique, and should not be collectively bargained along with
other conditions of employment. This rationalist formula
would deny unions a measure of political power, and therefore
threaten the entire structure of bargaining.
A second major attribute of public employee unions in
the state was that they formed a complex hierarchy based
on occupation, size of membership, militancy, and geographic
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location. Policemen, firemen and teachers were the most
favored occupational groups, with the oldest and most advan-
tageous traditions of pension benefits. Other uniformed
employees sought similar status, often with considerable
success.. General employees also sought to improve their
pension status. The two large unions, CSEA and D.C. 37,
succeeded up to a point, but during the 1970's each found
obstacles to new gains: CS1EA its own lack of militancy,
and D.C. 37, the very militancy which brought it into con-
flict with the governor and conservative legislators.
The public employee coalition organized to defeat pen-
sion reform worked for a while, as unions with different
positions in the hierarchy stayed together. Their prolonged
opposition to pension reform was extremely effective, esp-
ecially in 1973. But eventually, various groups began trying
to preserve special benefits. CSEA split off from the coal-
ition in return for a promise of noncontributory pensions.
Policemen and firemen gave up their determined opposition
to pension reform when they were assured of continued special
benefits. Corrections officers attempted, and were able,
to gain status similar to police officers. Many unions
therefore gave in to what they saw as the coming reality
of reform, by attempting to preserve whatever possible for
their own members. The only ones that stayed firmly opposed
were those for whom pension reform was clearly disadvanta-
geous.
- 166 -
A third characteristic of labor organizations was that
they did not expect a sustained, successful counterbalance
to their power in pension affairs. Unions continued to see
the Pension Commission as an illegitimate, industry-oriented
group wrongly ensconced in the executive branch of govern-
ment, not as an agency entrusted with protecting the public.
This contributed to the belief of some unions in 1976 that
they could prevent reformers' new encroachments on pensions,
despite the publicity about pensions, the new "fiscal climate,"
and the Commission's own increased sophistication.
The New York state legislature did not initiate pension
reform proposals, but ultimately proved to be responsive
to the reform movement. The legislative leadership did not
immediately give any support to the Kinzel reforms in 1973.
The press denounced this as a failure to deal properly with
the issue, but there was nothing unusual in this delay of
a plan that proposed so many radical changes. The Pension
Commission's tactics contributed to the legislature's natural
caution.
Various strategies delayed consideration of pension
reform and made it more politically acceptable. The three-
year moratorium enabled legislators to virtually ignore
pensions for a time, during which the Commission could in-
vent co'alition bargaining, legislators would have an excuse
to give unions for not providing new benefits, and the pension
reform movement might even fade. The Select Committee pur-
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ported to show democratic policy making, by including in its
deliberations everyone whom the Pension Commission had neg-
lected: Legislators, local officials, unions, civic groups.
It achieved legislative acceptance of a weak version of pen-
sion reform.
Partisanship in the legislature was important but not
critical. Republicans and Democrats were equally averse to
offending public employee unions. Republicans however, were
firm supporters of upstate police and firemen's interests,
while Democrats also sided with other, NYC public employee
unions. Eventually, legislators also came to appreciate
the Pension Commission as a buffer between themselves and
unions, when they perceived that increased public employee
benefits would not necessarily gain them votes.
Partisanship was more relevant to legislative strategy
in 1976, when leaders of both parties clearly thought that
pension refrom would be an important election issue. Repub-
licans hoped to gain an edge over Democrats; Democrats used
the issue in order to help marginal members.
But only a vocal minority really pushed pension reform.
A very few legislators. adopted it as a key issue and forced
its consideration, with the crucial help of outside lobby-
ists and publicity. New York City's fiscal crisis gave im--
petus to pension reform 1975-76, by encouraging even greater
lobbying and publicity. It also weakened unions, who received
much of the blame for the crisis and accepted measures such
as wage-increase deferrals, and purchases of city notes by
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pension funds. But it still did not convince legislative
leaders to embrace major reform. For most of 1976 they were still
prepared to delay reform if possible.
In five years the Pension Commission succeeded in be-
coming a strong force in public pensions, achieving its goal
of counterbalancing unions, at least at the legislative level.
Its reforms achieved a presumably uniform system for most
public employees in the state. It also designed the first
state pension plan with a formal cost-of-living adjustment.
On the minus side, in terms of public policy, the Com-
mission remained at the end of that period without labor
representation, except for nonvoting special observers.
Although reformers mostly approved of this, it detracted
from the Commissions' supposed nonpartisan character. The
Commission did not deal with the needs of the poorest public
employees -- those whose wages are low even in the final
years of service, and those whose pensions may be inadequate.
The most expensive public pensions stayed that way, relative
to other workers -- that is, police and firemen's benefits --
and there was some question as to whether CO-ESC would ever
apply to these employees.
A number of issues remained unresolved. First, how much
money would be saved by pension reform could not really be
known. Questions. of the administration of Social Security
integration, and of the escalator, were not resolved. There
could be no immediate proof that Social Security would have
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the predicted impact on retirement income. Conflicts over
data remained. Although the Shinn report came closer than
any other to resolving uncertainties about the funding of
the NYC pension systems, there was still some doubt about how
well funded those systems were or should be, and about some
actuarial assumptions. Questions remained about how public
employee pensions compared to private ones, since despite
the Shinn report there were many complaints that CO-ESC
was too generous. Public employee unions did not indicate
any intentions of withdrawing from the fight, and letting
CO-ESC remain the pension policy of the future.
In a subject where the existence of profound antagonism
between opposing forces is inevitable, as is true of pension
reform, it is not possible to assert that there is some
middle ground where the opponents can meet and achieve some-
thing more advantageous than they are able to under full-
scale conflict. But, having achieved farly secure status
as an agency capable of enacting some of its goals, the
Pension Commission could probably turn its attention to as-
pects of pensions that are not solely related to costs and
to countering unions' powers in local and state government,
and exchange some of its ideological purity for some greater
representation of those concerned withfension policy.
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